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[COMMITTEE PRINT] 



EXPOSE 

OF 

SOVIET ESPIONAGE 

MAY 1960 



PREPARED BY THE 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

J. Edgar Hoover, Director 



TRANSMITTED BY DIRECTION OF 

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 

FOR USE OF THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINIS- 
TRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND 
OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 




Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 



UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
57425 WASHINGTON : 1960 



B, Coplon - Gubitchev Case 27 

C, Fuchs - Gold - Rosenberg 

Atomic Espionage Conspiracy 27 

1. Harry Gold 27 

2» David Greenglass 29 

J, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg JO 

4. Morton Jobell 3^ 

5, William Perl 32 

6. Alfred Dean Slack 32 

7, Abraham Brothman 33 

8, Miriam Moskowitz 33 

9. Anatoli Yakovlev 3^ 
10, Semen Markovich Semenov J4 

D, Clarence Howard Vetterli Case 35 

E, Otto Verber - Kurt Ponger Case J6 

F» Jack Soble Case 37 

1, Jack and Myra Soble 37 

2» Jacob Albam 39 

J. Jane and George Zlatovski 39 

4. Alfred and Martha Stern 40 

5. Ilya Wolston 40 

6, Mark Zborowski 41 

7, Vassili Molev 42 
3, Mikhail Nikolaevich Svirin 42 

G, Colonel Rudolf Ivanovich Abel Case 4J 

1. Reino Hayhanen 4J 

2, Colonel Rudolf Ivanovich Abel 4J 
J. Roy Adair Rhodes 44 

IT, SOVIET NATIONALS DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA 
OR OTHERWISE REMOVED IROM THM.IR OFFICIAL 
ASSIGNMENTS IN TEE UNITED STATES IROM 

JANUARY 1, 19^0, THROUGH MAY 1, 19^ 46 

A, Yuri Vasilyevich Novikov 46 

3, Igor Aleksandrovich Amosov 47 



C, Aleksandr Petrovich Kovalev 48 

D, Leonid Tgorovich Pivnev 49 

E, Maksim Grigorievich Martynov $0 

F, Aleksandr Konstantinovich Guryanov $0 

G, Ivan Aleksandrovich Bubchikov 5^ 

H. Boris Fedorovich Gladkov 5^ 

I, Rostislav E, Shapovalov 52 

J, Viktor Ivanovich Petrov 52 

K, Konstantin Pavlovich Ekimov 53 

L, Yuri Pavlovich Krylov 53 

M, Vassili Mikhailovich Molev 5* 

N, Vladimir Arsenevich Grusha 54 

0, Gennadi Fedorovich Mashkantsev 55 

P, Nikolai Ivanovich Kurochkin 5^ 

Q» Kirill Sergeevich Doronkin 5^ 

R, E'vgeni Alekseevich Zaostrovtsev 57 

S, Vadim Aleksandrovich Kirilyuk 5^ 

III, INTJiENATIONAL ASPJjJCTS OF SOVIET ESPIONAGE 

AGAINST TEE UNITmJ) STATES 59 

A, Dr, Alan Nunn May 59 

3. Sam Carr 69 

0, Ignacy Samuel Witczak 60 

D, Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs 62 

E, PontecorvOf Burgess and Maclean 62 



SOVIET'BLOC INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 



1 . INTRODUCTION: 

Recent Soviet propaganda ?ia8 denounced the United 
States for aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet Union in terms 
designed to convince the world that the USSR would not stoop 
to espionage. In discussing this subject and the reception 
which President Ei senhower might expect on his visit to 
Russia, Premier Khrushchev was quoted in the newspapers on 
May 11, i960, as wondering what would have been the reaction of 
the American people if the Russians had sent a plane over the 
United States on the eve of his visit to this country. 

The facts are that at the very time Premier Khrushchev 
was advancing to the podium to speak before the United Nations 
General Assembly on September Id, 1959> two Soviet espionage 
agents were cautiously surveying a street corner in Springfield, 
Massachusetts, in preparation for a clandestine meeting with an 
American whom they were attempting to subvert. At the very 
time that Khrushchev was declaring that a means must be found 
to stop mankind from backsliding into an abyss of war, Vadim A, 
Kirilyuk, Soviet employee of the United Nations, was attempting 
to induce this American to furnish information regarding United 
States cryptographic machines and to secure employment in a 
vital United States Government agency where he could obtain 
classified information for the Russians, While this meeting 
was taking place Kirilyuk and the American were under observation 
by Leonid A, Kovalev, another Soviet employee of the United 
Nations who was conducting a counter surveillance. Unknown to 
the Russians, however, this meeting was also being observed by 
Special Agents of the FBI who obtained photographs of the Russians, 

Not only did these RusMians stoop to spying, but they 
callously abused their status as guests of this country to spy 
in the most reprehensible manner — the subversion of an American 
on American soil. 



1 - 



Although FBI Agents observed this meeting and photo- 
graphed the Russians, no publicity uas given to this incident 
in view of the negotiations which were then in progress. This 
incident, as contrasted with the recent handling of the plane 
incident by the Russians, gives ample testimony as to which 
country is acting in good faith in trying to maintain world peace. 

And this is not an isolated incident - nor has the 
target alxmys been so limited. The facts are that Soviet agents 
for three decades have engaged in extensive espionage against 
this country, and through the years have procured a volume of 
information which would stagger the imagination. This infor- 
mation includes literally dozens of aerial photographs of major 
U. So cities and vital areas which have given the Russians the 
product of aerial reconnaissance Just as surely as if Soviet 
planes had been sent over this country. 

2. ACQUISITION OF AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS: 

In a free country such things as aerial photographs 
are available to the public and can be purchased commercially. 
The Sovietehave been fully aware of this and throughout the 
years have taken full advantage of this free information, 
collecting aerial photographs of many areas of the United States. 

For example, during October, 1953> "t^wo Soviet officials 
visited Minneapolis where they purchased fifteen aerial 
photographs of Minneapolis and St. Paul. In October and November, 
1953> 'two Soviets traveled in Missouri and Texas and obtained 
aerial maps of Dallas, Tulsa, Fort Worth and the surrounding 
areas covering a Naval air station, an Army airfield, and an 
Air Force base. In April, 195^> a Soviet official purchased 
aerial photographs of five Long Island communities. Also, in 
April, 19S-^f a Soviet official purchased three aerial photographs 
of Boston, Massachusetts, and Newport, Rhode Island, areas. In 
^yt 195^t three Soviets traveled to California where they 
ordered from a Los Angeles photography shop $dO worth of aerial 
photographs covering the Los Angeles area. 

However, they have not been content with acquisition 
of publicly available data. For example, on May J, 195'^t 
Leonid E. Pivnev, an assistant Soviet air attache stationed in 
Washington, who had previously traveled extensively throughout 
the United States and had obtained commercially available aerial 
photographs of various areas of this country, requested a 



Washington, Dc Co, photographer to rent an airplane to take 
photographs of New York City which were not commercially available, 
He specified the scale to be used and the altitude from which the 
photographs were to be taken. He offered $700 for this activity. 
Obviously the photographs which he requested would depict vital 
port areas, industrial facilities, and military installations in 
the New York area. 

For this brazen abuse of his diplomatic privileges 
Fivnev was declared persona non grata on May 29, 195^t °^ 
departed from this country on June 6, 195'^' 

But this did not stop the Soviets^ They continued 
their systematic program of collecting aerial photographs of 
major cities and vital areas of the United Stateso On January 19, 
1955!i ifif State Department sent a note to the Soviet Ambassador 
placing restrictions on the acquisition of certain types of data 
by Soviet citizens in the United States. These restrictions 
were comparable to restrictions on American citizens in Russia 
and in part prohibited Soviet citizens from obtaining aerial 
photographs except where they "appear in or are appendices to 
newspapers, periodicals, technical Journals, atlases and books 
commercially available to the general publico" 

Soviet reaction to the restrictions was typical of 
their philosophy. They began circumventing the restrictions 
by subverting Americans to purchase aerial photographs for 
them. One month after the restrictions became effective, 
Nikolai I. Trofimov, a Soviet official in Mexico, began negoti- 
ations for a resident of the west coast of the United States 
to obtain aerial photographs of 4$ major United States cities. 
Nineteen of these cities are located near Strategic Air Command 
bases. The remaining 26 are all strategic cities in or near 
which are located air bases, naval bases, research or training 
stations, atomic energy installations or important industrial 
facil I ties. 

During April, 195^> Vladimir D. Loginov, a Soviet 
employee of the United Nations used the same technique to 
obtain an aerial map of New York City. At 10 p.m. on April 26, 
195^t Loginov secretly met an individual in a darkened parking 
lot at the railroad station in Scarsdale, New York, where this 
map was delivered to Loginov. Months later on November 1$, 195^> 
this same par-king lot was again utilized by the Soviets to 
obtain aerial photographs of Chicago, Illinois, On this 
occasion, the photographs were turned over to Kirill S. Doronkin, 
another Soviet employee of the United Nations. In this same 
operation, the Soviets attempted to obtain aerial photographs of 
Portland, Oregon; Seattle, Washington^ and San Diego and San 
Franc I SCO, California. 



574Z5 O - 60 



Circumvention of the restrictions also took the form, 
of trickery and deceits For example, on July 17, 1959, Viktor 7, 
Fomin, assistant Soviet military attache and Anatoli G. Yasilev, 
an employee of the Soviet Uilitary Attache in Washington, D, C, 
obtained an aerial photograph of the Glasgow Air Force Base in 
Montana from the local Chamber of Commerce by posing as 
tourists without identifying themselves as Soviet officials . On 
July 24, 1959, they obtained an aerial photograph of Thermopolis, 
Wyoming, by bullying the clerk at the Chamber of Commerce in an 
arrogant and insistent manney again posing as touristSc They 
were given the photograph in spite of the fact that such a 
photograph is not normally given to touristSo 

It is apparent from the examples cited that the Soviet 
Union reaps the benefits of aerial reconnaissance of the United 
States just as surely as if planes were sent over this country. 



The acquisition of aerial photographs is only one 
phase of Soviet~bloc intelligence activity in the United Spates, 
but the manner in which it has been done illustrates two basic 
Soviet intelligence concepts^ namely, to exploit the weaknesses 
of Amer icans whenever possible and to take full advantage of all 
the freedoms of our democratic society^ 

Following these concepts, the Soviets through the use 
of such devices as entrapment, blackmail, threats, and promises 
have exploited human frailty^ The record is replete with 
examples of such exploitation of Americans throughout the years 
following the Russian Revolution in 1917o For example, 
Nicholas Dozenberg, a naturalised American, first became 
associated with the communist movement about 1920, In 1928 he 
was recruited into Soviet espionage activities with the approval 
of the Communist Party , He was recruited by one Alfred Tilton, 
who was an illegal agent of Soviet Uilitary Intelligence, posing 
as a Canadian citizen and in possession of a Canadian passport. 
One of the early assignments given to Dozenberg was the sounding 
out of other Americans for later recruitment by Tilton. 
Dozenberg, after pleading guilty to violations of the passport 
laws, served a term in prison in 1940 and thereafter prior to 
his death cooperated with United States Government agencies. 



Simon Rosenberg, another naturalized American of 
Polish background, during 29JI loas sent to Russia by his 
employer. While there, he met representatives of a Soviet 
intelligence agency and under threats of reprisals to be 
taken against his sister who was then living in Russia, he 
agreed to work in behalf of the Russians upon his return to 
the United States. His principal assignment in this country 
was to obtain technical and industrial information, Rosenberg, 
who is now deceased, also cooperated with agencies of the 
Government, prior to his death, as have many other Americans 
who have been involved in Soviet intelligence activity. 

Another example is the case of Hafis Salich, a 
naturalized American employed by the Office of Naixil Intelligence 
in California who met Mikhail N, Gorin through a mutual 
acquaintance in 1937" Gorin was then the Pacific Coast 
manager of Intourist. By advancing Salich money, Gorin 
ultimately persuaded him to furnish Office of Naval Intelligence 
reports for which Gorin paid $1700. Gorin and Salich were found 
guilty of espionage in 1939 and Salich was sentenced to four 
years imprisonment, which he served. Gorin appealed his 
conviction and sentence of six years to the Supreme Court of the 
United States which unanimously upheld the conviction in 19^1; 
however, the trial Judge suspended execution of the sentence and 
placed him on probation provided he would pay a $10,000 fine and 
leave the United States, never to return. 

The decade of 1950 - 196O has been no exception. It 
began with the trial and conviction of Valentin Gubitchev, a 
Soviet employee of the United Nations who had obtained infor- 
mation from Judith Coplon, an employee of the Department of 
Justice. This conviction was soon followed by convictions of 
several Soviet agents in the Julius and Ethel Rosenberg network 
in 1951 > i>y ihs sentencing of Otto Verber and Kurt Ponger in 
i9S3 o.fter they pleaded guilty to espionage; by the guilty pleas 
of espionage by Jack and Myra Soble and Jacob Albam in 1957 <2^ 
later in the same year the conviction of Colonel Rudolf Abel, a 
Soviet illegal agent in this country. 

These prosecutions, although they clearly establish 
the nature of Soviet espionage activities against this country, 
involve only a part of the Soviet-bloc espionage attack which 
has included numerous Soviet attempts to penetrate United States 
Government agencies. For example, the prosecution of Judith 
Coplon, an employee of the Department of Justice in early 1950 
was followed in October, 1950, by a Soviet assignment to Boris 
Morros, an American motion picture producer who was cooperating 
with the FBI, to revive his acquaintance with a member of the 
United States Atomic Energy Commission; to obtain compromising 

- 5 - 



information oonaarning thia individual} and to carefully 
explore the poaaibility of placing a aeoretary in hia office 
who could furniah infoimation to the Ruaaiana. Morroa 
previoualy in 1948 had been given the aaaigment to attempt 
to obtain information which could be uaed by the Ruaaiana in 
an effort to compromiae United Statea General Clay in Germany. 

Another example occurred during 1954 when Soviet 
intelligence officera in Germany approached an American Army 
officer atationed in Germany who waa aoon to be retired. They 
propoaitioned him to work for the Sovieta after hia return to the 
United Statea and aet up a achedule for meetinga in Hew Tork City. 
Purauant to the arrangementa, Uakaim G, Uartynov, counaelor of the 
Soviet Repreaentation to the United Nationa Military Staff 
Committee, carried out a aeriea of clandeatine meetinga in New Tork 
with a peraon whom he believed to be the Amy officer, Aa a 
reault of hia abuae of hia atatua, Uartynov waa declared 
peraona non grata on February 21, 195S» 

Another example ia that of Evgeniy A, Zaoatrovtaev, 
aecond aecretary of the Soviet Bmbaaay who waa declared peraona 
non grata on May 13, 1959, for attempting to aubvert a State 
Department employee to obtain ir\formation from State Department 
filea, 

A more recent example haa been previoualy cited 
involving the attempt by Vadim Kirilyuk, an employee of the 
United Nationa, to penetrate a vital Government agency by 
tnatructing an American to obtain employment in that agency. 

Soviet attempta to recruit Americana during thia period 
have not been confined to attempta to infiltrate Government 
agenciea. For example, in February, 1954, Igor A. Amoaov, 
aaaiatant Soviet naval attache, waa declared peraona non grata for 
attempting to obtain information concerning radar and United Statea 
naval veaaela from a buaineaaman who had commercial dealinga with 
the Ruaaiana and who waa in a poaition to obtain auch data. 

In June, 1956, Ivan A. Bubchikov, an aaaiatant Soviet 
military attache waa declared peraona non grata for attempting 
to obtain data regarding radar, guided miaailea, jet fuela and 
atomic aubmariTiea from an American buaineaaman who during World 
War II had extenaive contacta with the Ruaaiana on both private 
and United Statea Government buaineaa. The Sovieta attempted 
to exploit hia World War II friendlineaa. 

In Auguat, 1956, Viktor I, Petrov, a Soviet tranalator 
at the United Nationa, waa releaaed from hia employment for 
recruiting an employee of an American aviation company to obtain 
claaaified data regarding United Statea aircraft. 

- 5 - 



4. THE INTl'lLLIGJiJ^CE ROLn; OF THt; SOVIeT-BLOC OFFICIALS 

Only a few of the many examples of abuse of their diplomatic 
privileges by Soviet-bloc officials in the United States have been 
mentioned* In the more flagrant cases, the United States Government 
has asked the offending officials to leave this country. During the 
decade, 195^ - 19^0, 19 Soviet officials have been asked to leave. 
Many more have been engaged in intelltgence activities throughout 
the years* 

The Soviet Ifiiion has maintained a large staff of officials 
in this country since its first recognition in 1933* These officials 
have been assigned to Soviet embassies, consulates, trade delegations, 
news media, the IMited Nations, and the Amtorg Trading Corporation, 
It is from these installations that the primary intelligence activities 
are directed against the Ifiiited States, A former Soviet intelligence 
officer who defected from the Soviets has estimated that from yC^o 
to SOPjo of the Soviet officials in the United States have some type 
of intelligence assignment. Other defectors have confirmed that a 
high per cent of the officials are intelligence agents. As of May 1, 
i960, there were 328 Soviet officials stationed in this country. They 
were accompanied by 4$^ dependents, many of whom are also potential 
intelligence agents. 

Nor is this the full strength of Soviet-bloc intelligence. 
As of May 1, I96O, there were 272 satellite officials stationed in 
the United States accompanied by 435 dependents. This almost doubles 
the potential of Soviet intelligence services. The satellite 
intelligence services have been developed according to the Soviet 
pattern, their personnel selected or approved by the Soviets and 
they are trained and guided by Soviet policies and procedures. 
Recent defectors from satellite intelligence services have advised 
that the Soviets have access to all data obtained by the satellites 
and, in fact, maintain an advisor system at headquarters level to 
make certain that the satellites operate consistent with Soviet 
interests. 

This coordination is not limited to headquarters' 
levels. Beginning in November, 195^, the Soviet and 
satellite military, naval and air attaches stationed in 
the United States began a series of monthly meetings under 
the guidance of the Soviet military attache. During this 



- 7 ' 



initial meeting the satellite representatives were given 
specific target assignments for the collection of information 
desired by the Soviets and arrangements were made for the 
over-all correlation of their activities. 

$. INDUSTRIAL SPYING AND CIRCUIJTENTION OF REGULATIONS: 

This large group of Soviet-bloc officials 
stationed in the United States has systematically over the 
years developed a most important part of the modern 
intelligence machine which was referred to by one Soviet 
official as the best industrial spying system in the 
world. Volumes could be written as to the techniques 
used and the ways and means developed by the Soviet bloc 
to obtain information regarding the industrial potential 
of the United States often with the use of subterfuge 
and deceit as well as deliberate circumvention of Customs 
regulations. 

The following examples illustrate this 
activi ty: 

In 1924 the Amtorg Trading Corporation vxis 
organized in New York for the purpose of acting as an 
importer and exporter on the North American continent for 
official trusts of the Soviet Union. Amtorg continued to 
operate during World War II, although in 1942 the Soviet 
Government created the Soviet Government Rirchasing 
Commission in Washington, D^ C, to purchase war material. 
This Purchasing Commission ivas dissolved after the end of 
World War II, and its activities absorbed by Amtorg, 
Since its organization, Amtorg Trading Corporation has 
been staffed primarily by representatives of the Soviet 
Government who have official status. Former employees of 
Amtorg have advised that it was standard practice for 
Soviets attached to Amtorg to request permissi on for Soviet 
officials to visit industrial facilities throughout the 
country on the promise of orders to be forthcoming if the 
products were found satisfactory. In many instances the 
officials of the companies would later be advised by 
Amtorg that Moscow would have to approve the order. In 
instances where a contract lias given to a particular 
company, Amtorg consistently demanded blueprints of the 
particular product and other data to which it was not 



entitled by normal business practices. Amtorg officials 
also consistently insisted on a clause in the contract 
which would give Soviet inspectors the privilege of 
inspecting all of the merchandise before it was shipped 
to Russia. 

Another device utilized by Amtorg officials was 
to gain the confidence of some employee in a plant which 
had a contract with the Russian Government and, through 
this employee, obtain blueprints which were copied in the 
Amtorg office and the copies forwarded to Russia. Amtorg 
officials would also advertise for employees who, when they 
appeared for an interview at the Amtorg office, would be 
instructed to bring proof of their ability in the form of 
blueprints of former projects. When the applicants for 
employment later showed up with the blueprints, the 
blueprints would be photographed and the photographs 
forwarded to Russia. 

Amtorg has also followed a practice of preparing 
detailed catalogues concerning American industry. Congressman 
Mxndt on January 29, 194^, described one of these catalogues 
as "a manual for bombing America. " It was pointed out that 
the book contained detailed information including many 
photographs and maps of vital areas of the United States. 
In this connection Amtorg Trading Corporation during the 
1940's prepared a monthly magazine called "American 
Engineering and Industry" and an annual guide called 
"Catalogue of American Engineering and Industry. " This 
latter publication in 1946 was described as a three-volume, 
S, OOO-page document. 

In August, 195^> Milos Frochazka, a Czechoslovakian 
official assigned to the Commercial Office at the Czech 
Embassy, furnished to an American the specifications for the 
components of 2 steel mills to be purchased in the United 
States for the Czechs. He outlined a plan whereby the American 
would act as an exclusive agent to purchase these mills 
ostensibly for a private concern in a Western country. He 
would obtain estimates and if the estimates were approved, 
the Czechs would furnish the name of the purchasing 
company, a power of attorney and the necessary bank credit. 
Thereafter, the mills would be shipped to the Czech agent in 
the Western country and then transshipped to Czechoslovakia. 



- 9 - 



6. EXPLOITATION OF PUBLIC INFORMATION: 

It is no secret that one of the results of the 
freedom of our democratic society is the availability of 
voluminous information to members of the public merely 
for the asking. Some of the cases previously cited clearly 
indicate that the Soviet-bloc intelligence services are 
aware of this fact and have taken full advantage of this 
democratic freedom; however, it remains for former 
Soviet-bloc intelligence officers to testify as to its 
real significance and importance to the Soviet-bloc 
intelligence services. One defector has stated that the 
ease with which information is obtained in this country 
has resulted in a reduction of the hazardous and time- 
consuming clandestine operations which would otherwise 
be necessary. Another has estimated that the Soviet 
Military Attache's office in the United States is able to 
legally obtain 9$% of the material useful for its intelligence 
objectives. He stated that, in fact, 90^ of an intelligence 
agent's time in any other country in the world would 
normally be consumed clandestinely obtaining information 
which is readily available in the United States through 
Government agencies or commercial publishing houses. He 
pointed out that Polish military intelligence obtains 
more technical data in the United States than from all the 
other countries in the world combined. 

Although such information is collected in a 
number of ways, the following techniques in addition to 
those previously mentioned have been most productive. 

One of the most useful techniques is attendance 
at conventions of American organizations by Soviet-bloc 
officials. During the year preceding FChrushchev ' s visit 
to this country, Soviet officials alone attended 
approximately JO conventions covering various fields of 
endeavor including aeronautics, electronics, plastics 
development, education and others^ Typical were the 
activities of 2 Soviets who attended the Western Electric 
convention held in Los Angeles during August, 1959' As 
usual, at the inception, they began to collect voluminous 
literature. When the volume became unwieldy one Soviet 
left the material at a check stand and resumed his 
collection activities. It was estimated that the literature 
picked up by these Soviets at this one convention weighed 
approximately 2^0 pounds. 



10 



Another technique utilized is correspondence with 
chambers of commerce and industrial facil i ties throughout 
the United States through which voluminous information 
regarding transportation systems, major industries, etc., 
is obtained. In many instances useful maps of the areas 
are also secured. 

Still another technique is the subscription to 
American publications and collection and review of 
United States Government documents. For example, during 
June, 1959> '* ""s ascertained that the personnel of the 
Soviet Military, Naval and Air Attache Offices subscribed 
to 44 newspapers and S^ magazines of a technical, scientific, 
military and general news nature. It is apparent that the 
Soviets have a definite program of subscribing to 
newspapers published at or in the vicinity of vital 
United States military bases. 

Purchases from the United States Government 
have long been a productive source for Soviet-bloc 
intelligence. For example, on December 28, 19^^f the 
Soviet Government Purchasing Commission in Washington, D. C, 
ordered copies of 5,8l0 patents. On the same date the 
New York office of this Commission purchased two copies of 
18,000 patents. On January 1, 194$, the Soviet Government 
Purchasing Commission in Washington again ordered copies 
of 5/J^^ different patents. On January 12, 19'^5> copies 
of 41, 812 patents were ordered. The next order was for 
41,810. The acquisition of copies of patents has been 
continued throughout the years as illustrated by the fact 
that in early 1959 Anatoli G. Vasilev, an employee of the 
Office of the Soviet Military Attache, requested an American 
to instruct him in the use of the "Search Room" of the 
United States Patent Office so that he could locate patents 
in which he was interested. 

The Soviets have, of course, not restricted 
themselves to the acquisition of patents. For example, on 
Mirch 10, 195'^> o^ Assistant Soviet Air Attache purchased 
"The Pilot's Handbook" for the East and West Coasts of the 
United States from the United States Coast and Geodetic 
Survey of the Department of Commerce. On Mirch 12, 195^t 
a chauffeur of the Soviet Air Attache purchased "The 
Pilot's Handbook" for Canada and Alaska. Six days later 
an Assistant Soviet Attache ordered "The Pilot's Handbook" 
for the Far Fast and Europe. These handbooks contained 

- 11 - 



57425 O - 60 



diagrams of all of the principal airfields and the 
approaches used in landing planes. 

In April, 19$4, Soviet officials stationed 
in Washington obtained from the iiip Information Office 
of the U. S. Geological Survey, Department of the Interior, 
topographic maps covering North Carolina, Michigan, Illinois, 
Kentucky, and an area within a ^0-miIe radius of 
Washington, D. C. 

This collection activity has continued unabated 
up to the present time. Literally thousands of similar 
documents are obtained in this country every year by 
Soviet-bloc officials assigned in this country and through 
registered agents such as the Four Continent Book Corporation 
and the Tass News Agency. 

A statement of a satellite defector illustrates 
the value to the Soviet-bloc of IMited States Government 
publications. He stated that on one occasion, Polish 
military intelligence obtained an id-volume edition 
prepared by the United States Army Engineers regarding 
United States port facilities. It uxis purchased from 
the Government Printing Office at nominal cost, but its 
estimated value to the Polish military intelligence was 
placed at $$0,000. 

Not content with the large volume of publicly 
available material, Soviet-bloc officials have resorted 
to deceit. For example, on November $, 195&> ^on 
Dubesteanu, an assistant military attache of the Rumanian 
Legation in Washington, !>. C, was declared persona non 
grata for activity beyond the scope of his official duties. 
Using a false name and identity, Dubesteanu had corresponded 
with U. S. military installations soliciting material and 
had rented post office boxes at North Beach, Miry land, under 
assumed names to which such material was to be sent. 

Reconnaissance trips by Soviet-bloc officials have 
been a most productive source of intelligence. The 
officials have been observed to carefully prepare for such 
trips by reviewing publications collected in this country, 
doing research at the Library of Congress, et cetera. 
Exclusive of trips from Washington, D. C, to New Fork City, 
officials of the Soviet Military Office alone took l6 trips 



12 



to various areas of the country in 1958 and 1959* They visited 
26 states in I958 and 37 in 1959, They covered most of the 
strategic areas of the country and covered some areas as many as 
four times. During these trips they followed a definite pattern 
of visiting chambers of commerce, driving around the perimeter 
of industrial facilities and wherever possible circled military, 
naval and air installations in the areas visited. They collected 
all available literature and maps relating to industrial facilities, 
transportation systems, power plants, dams, chemical factories, 
et cetera, and wherever possible took photographs in addition to 
making extensive notes, 

7, mOPAGANDA AND PMiSONAL APFEARANCJUS 

Exploitation of our freedoms has also taken the form 
of propaganda. Not content with the distribution of over 20,000 
copies of the illustrated monthly magazine, "USSi," which is in 
reciprocity for distribution of a similar American magazine in 
the Soviet Union, the Soviet Embassy has a carefully planned 
program of distributing press releases. As of February, I96O, 
the Press Department of the Soviet Embassy was distributing 
press releases to almost 7,000 individuals and institutions in 
the United States, including newspaper editors, business leaders, 
radio stations, public libraries, television stations, teachers, 
labor leaders, scientists, and leaders in trade and commerce. 

In addition, since January 1, 1959 > JO different 
officials attached to the Soviet Embassy have made, or were 
scheduled to make, 74 public appearances (not including 7 
additional invitations for appearances by the Soviet Ambassador) 
before various groups in this country. Nineteen other Soviets 
attached to the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations, employed 
by the Ifiiited Nations Secretariat or assigned to Intourist, made, 
or were scheduled to make, 39 public appearances during the same 
period. 

These public appearances normally involved speeches or 
participation in fonans on the part of the Soviet officials and 
were made before various types of groups, including high school, 
college, and university groups, parent-teacher associations, 
advertisement and civic clubs, fraternities, professional associa- 
tions or clubs, religious and cultural groups, travel clubs arid 
community centers. Some of these were television appearances. It 
is apparent that the Soviets are taking every opportunity to spread 
the gospel of communism by exploitation of the intense desire of 
Americans to learn more about the Soviet JMion, 

~ 13 - 



8. USE OF TfJK mTTTEn NATIONS 

Attention is called to the fact that many of the 
incidents and cases previously cited involved Soviet employees 
of the United Nations. They are guests of the United States and 
are supposedly dedicated to the cause of international peace but 
they are, in fact, carefully selected envoys of the international 
communist conspiracy, trained in trickery and deceit and dedicated 
to the concept of fully exploiting the freedoms of the countries 
they seek to destroy. It is too much to expect that they toould 
not prostitute the United Nations, 

Q. "TLLEGAZ" OPERATIONS 

Although Soviet-bloc intelligence services have made 
extensive use of their officials stationed in foreign countries 
for espionage purposes throughout the years, they have, in 
addition, operated a parallel clandestine espionage system knovn 
as the "illegal" system. As previously noted, "illegal" Soviet 
agents were dispatched to the United States as early as the 1920 's. 
Such "illegal" agents have no ostensible connection with the 
Soviet-bloc official establishments in the United States, but 
operate clandestinely, usually under false identities, making 
full use of secret communications channels and other clandestine 
techniques of operation. Their dual function is to bolster the 
espionage activities of the Soviet-bloc officials and to be 
prepared to take over all espionage operations in the event of 
war or other emergency which would cause a break in diplomatic 
relations. 

It is apparent that during the decade 19^0-1960 the 
Soviets have placed increasing emphasis on "illegal" operations. 
One former intelligence officer of the Soviet Ministry of State 
Security has advised that a special directorate was created in 
19^7 for the purpose of handling "illegal" agents. Another former 
intelligence officer, Reino Hayhanen, has stated that he was told, 
while in Moscow in 1952, that plans were being made to change over 
Soviet contacts from "legal" to "illegal" operations. Another 
former officer of the Soviet Ministry of State Security has 
advised that as early as June, 1952> an order was sent to 
intelligence agents in all western countries to prepare "illegal" 
organizations which could function without interruption under 
any conditions. 

That this policy was followed with respect to the 
United States is illustrated by the fact that in August, 195^t 
a female Soviet agent attempted to enter the United States from 

■^ 14 = 



Canada^ at Detroit using an authentic copy of a birth certificate 
previously issued to an American,. Detected by the United States 
border screening process, she was refused entry ^ Less than a 
year later, Rudolf J. Abel, a colonel in the Soviet Committee of 
State Security, was arrested in New York City where he was posing 
as an American photographer under the name Emil R. Qoldfus. Abel 
had entered the United States in 19'^8 using a passport issued to 
a naturalized American in IS'^? to visit relatives behind the 
Iron Curtain and who never returned to this country. Abel was 
subsequently convicted of espionage and sentenced to JO years 
imprisonment, which sentence he is now serving. 

It is interesting to note that in October, 19^2, the 
Soviets sent Reino Hayhanen to the United States to act as Abel's 
assistant, Hayhanen, prior to leaving Russia, had been given 
instructions by Mikhail N. Svirin, a Soviet intelligence officer. 
After his arrival in this country, Svirin, who had become First 
Secretary of the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations, met 
with Hayhanen and subsequently, during the period 1952-19$3, 
Hayhanen operated under his supervision. It was not until 195^ 
that Svirin gave instructions for Hayhanen to contact Abel and 
to act as Abel's assistant. 

The case involving Abel and Hayhanen is a striking 
example of Soviet use of "illegal" agents against the United 
Stateso In dispatching such agents to this country, we can be 
certain that the Soviet-bloc intelligence services will, as 
they have with their representatives who are dispatched to this 
country as diplomats, take full advantage of the freedoms of 
this country which are guaranteed by our Constitution. 

10. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF SOVIET ESPIONAGE 

The United States has not been the only target 
of the Soviet-bloc intelligence organizations. Many other 
countries of the world have felt the barbs of the Soviet 
espionage attack. The disclosures of the Royal Commission 
in Canada which followed the 194^ defection of Igor Gcuzenko, 
a Soviet code clerk, revealed a Soviet espionage apparatus which 
on a broad scale had recruited and subverted Canadian citizens 
while seeking to infiltrate the Canadian Government and drain 
off its secrets. The admissions of Klaus Fuchs in 1950 that 
he betrayed the free world when, as a member of the British 
Atomic Energy Team, he passed atomic secrets to the Russians 
clearly indicate the Soviet designs on information in possession 
of the British Government,, The flight of the British scientist 
Dr. Bruno Pontecorvo in 195^ o.nd the British diplomats Guy 

- 75 = 



Burgess and Donald MacLean in 19^1 behind the Iron Curtain 
adds additional proof. The report of the Royal Commission of 
the Commonwealth of Australia in 19$^^ following the defection 
of Vladimir and ffvdokia Petrov, Soviet espionage agents assigned 
to the Soviet Embassy in Australia, disclosed an extensive 
Soviet espionage apparatus directed against Australia. Many 
similar examples could be cited to illustrate that Soviet 
espionage is international in character and the expulsion of 
two Soviet officials from Switzerland during the past month 
clearly indicates that Soviet espionage is currently inter- 
national in character. 

Practically every one of the cases cited above, 
although based in other countries, had ramifications in the 
United States. For example, information furnished to the 
Russians by Dr. Allan Minn May, who was uncovered by 
Gouzenko, had been obtained when May visited a laboratory in 
Chicago in 1944. Klaus Fuchs worked on atomic energy in the 
United States from early 1944 through September, 19^5> ond 
supplied information to the Russians while in this country. 
The British diplomats Burgess and MacLean had been stationed 
in the United States prior to their disappearance behind the 
Iron Curtain. In spite of the use of third countries by the 
Soviet Union to ccmmit espionage against the United States, 
Premier Khrushchev has made strong threats of reprisal 
against his neighboring countries which he assumes have been 
used as bases for United States aerial reconnaissance of the 
Soviet Union. 

11, AIMS OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM 

The world-wide espionage networks of the Soviet Union 
are an essential and integral part of the over-all communist 
plan to completely dominate the world. However, to understand 
the significance of the intelligence activity, it is necessary 
to examine the basic aims and principles of communism. 

The highly authoritative "History of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)" summarized the teachings 
of Marx and Engels on the question of for j and violence. It 
stressed that Marx and Engels taught the impossibility of 
establishing a communist state by peaceful means, emphasizing 
that this could be achieved only through a proletarian 
revolution through which a dictatorship could be established 
and all resistance crushed. V. I. Lenin gave practical 
application to the teachings of Marx and Engels. Through 
the application of such principles the Bolsheviks seized power 

" 16 - 



in Russia in 191? and under Lenin's guidance, established a 
dictatorship through which all resistance was systematically 
crushed^ The success of the movement led Lenin to reiterate 
in later years that "The substitution of the proletarian state 
for the bourgeois state is impossible without a violent 
revolution. " 

Joseph Stalin followed the Marxist-Leninist 
principles. The Communist Party in the United States, since 
it was organized in September, 'l919> and throughout the years 
of Stalin's rule in Russia, was unalterably bound to Moscow. 
In the earlier years. Party leaders openly, boastfully and 
defiantly proclaimed their allegiance to and support of Soviet 
objectives. The nature of the Communist Party, USA, was 
exposed in 19^9 CLnd its leaders convicted in a court of law 
where the evidence laid out before the jury constituted 
irrefutable proof that the Communist Party, USA, advocated the 
overthrow and destruction of the Government of the United States 
by force and violence. The policies and activities of the 
Communist Party, USA, have not changed to dateo The current 
leaders of the Communist Party, like their predecessors, 
unwaveringly follow the lead of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union, 

Time and again, Soviet Premier Khrushchev has 
claimed that the Soviet Union does not and will not interfere 
in the affairs of other nations. Yet, in practically every 
country in the world to date the Soviet Union has established 
fifth columns in the form of Communist Parties which are under 
the complete domination and control of the Soviets and are 
sworn to uphold and aid the Soviet dream for world conquest. 
Through the directives it furnishes to these subversive forces, 
the Soviet Union clearly interferes with the political, social, 
and economic affairs of other nations on a continuing basis in 
the relentless drive toward world domination. 

Today, the rallying cry of world communism is 
"peaceful coexistence." However, on May $, 19^0, Premier 
lOirushchev, addressing the Supreme Soviet in Moscow, paid 
tribute to V. T. Lenin and stated "The Soviet people are 
proud to know that the cause of our great leader and teacher 
lives and triumphs and that Lenin's dreams are being translated 
into reality ^y hundreds and millizAS of people--builders of 
socialism and communism --and that Lenin's cause is winning all 
upright men on earth." Referring to the triumph of the ideas 
of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, Khrushchev toent on to reaffirm 
"Marxist-Leninist ideas" as the guide to the ultimate triumph 
of world communism. 

^ 17 ' 



Thus, the fact remains that the basic principles 
of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, demanding the use of force and 
violence , represent the guides for communism to achieve world 
conquest, 27ie extensive espionage activities directed against 
the IMited States which, in the past, have utilized communists 
and communist sympathizers in this country as well as other 
individuals who could be subverted, can be better understood 
when regarded as essential tools in the relentless and fanatical 
drive of international communism to conquer the world. 



18 - 



APPENDICES 



I. CASES INVOLVING COURT ACTIONS DURING THE PAST DECADE 



There are set forth hereinafter cases which have 
been presented to Federal Courts in the United States during 
the past ten years and which unquestionably reveal Soviet 
efforts to steal American secrets affecting the national 
security of this country. All these cases have withstood 
the exacting test of being tried under the democratic system 
of the American courts and the convictions obtained are 
ample proof of the charges made. 



19 



57425 O - 60 - 4 



A. Soviet Infiltration of the United States Government 

a. Testimonu of Elizabeth T„ Bentleu 

In November, 19^5t Elizabeth T. Bentl ey dis- 
closed operations of two extensive Soviet intelligence 
networks in United States Government agencies during 
World War II. She stated the networks were under the 
control of officials of Soviet establishments in the 
United States and involved a number of employees of the 
United States Government. She added one of the networks 
was headed by Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, a United 
States Government employee in Washington, D. C., and the 
second network was under the direction of Victor Perlo, 
also a United States Government employee. 

Elizabeth Bentley fiad been engaged in communist 
activities enuring the 1930s, and in 193^ became acquainted 
with Jacob Golos whose true name was Jacob Raisin. Golos 
was head of World Tourist, Incorporated, and utilized 
that organization to arrange travel for communists and 
Soviet agents. Upon instructions from Golos, a cover 
agency for Soviet intelligence operations was established 
under the name of the United States Service and Shipping, 
Incorporated, and Elizabeth T, Bentley became an official 
of that company. Under the direction of Golos, Bentley, 
in 19^1, began collecting information for Soviet intel- 
ligence from sources in Washington, Do Co, and her role 
became more important due to the ill health of Golos as time 
went on. After the death of Golos in November, 19^3:) 
Bentley continued her operations in Soviet espionage, first 
consulting with Earl Browder, then head of the American 
Communi st Party, whom she had previously met through 
Golos. The activities of Bentley consisted of collecting 
information from various individuals who were employed 
by United States Government agencies and the information 
covered a variety of subjects including aircraft produc- 
tion data, data concerning financial activities particularly 
as they related to foreign commitments of the United States, 
information from the Foreign Economic Administration, the j 

War Production Board, the Justice Department, the Board of 
Economic Warfare and numerous other sources. 



20 



During the course of her intelligence operations 
for the Soviets, Elizabeth T. Bentley, met Anatoli B. 
Gromov, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, 
D. C, and upon instructions from Gromov, one of Bentley' s 
Soviet intelligence superiors, Bentley ceased regular 
courier operations in December, 19"^- In the Fall of 1945t 
Bentley had tun meetings with Anatoli B. Gromov and on the 
occasion of one of these meetings he paid her $2,000 for 
past services. Much of the information furnished by 
Elizabeth T. Bentley has been corroborated and shows that 
the Soviet intelligence service was receiving a volume of 
information from persons named by Bentley from the files of 
United States Government agencies in Washington, Do C. The 
individuals named by Bentley, for the most part, have sought 
refuge behind the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States when questioned by Government investigative com- 
mittees and official Government sources concerning their 
act ivitieso 

1 . The Case of Edward Josevh Fitzgerald 

In November, 19^^, Elizabeth T, Bentley advised 
that early in 19^, through arrangements with Earl Browder, 
then head of the American Communist Party, she met a 
group of individuals in New York City including one 
Edward Joseph Fitzgerald, Fitzgerald was born in 1911 
in New York City and was employed by the United States 
Government from 193^ *o 19^7 in several Government 
agencies. 

Elizabeth T, Bentley stated that these individuals 
talked freely in her presence, that there was di 3cussicn 
as to the payment of Communi st Party dues to Elizabeth 
To Bentley and a general discussion as to the type of 
information each person could furnish, Fitzgerald, who 
was at that time associated with the War Production 
Board, an agency of the United States Gove'^nment, 
indicated he could supply Bentley with miscellaneous 
statistics that came to his attention. She later met 
Fitzgerald on four or five occasions in New York City 
and on these occasions Fitzgerald was acting as a 
representative of the Victor Perlo group in bringing 
information to Bentley. 



- 21 - 



Subsequent investigation of Fitzgerald 
showed him to have been in contact with numerous 
individuals mentioned by Bentley and also disclosed 
that he was associated with other individuals who 
were reported to be communists or pro-Soviet 
sympathizers. 

In August, 19^4, the Internal Security 
Division of the Department of Justice gave con- 
sideration to action that could be taken against 
individuals named by Elizabeth T. Bentley under 
Public Law 600, 8jrd Congress, which is commonly 
known as the Immunity Act, 

On September 1, 19S'^> Sdward Joseph 
Fitzgerald appeared before a Federal Grand Jury in 
Camden, New Jersey, and invoked the Fifth Amendment 
in response to questions relating to the allegations 
of Elizabeth T. Bentley. He again claimed the Fifth 
Amendment before a Federal Grand Jury in New York City 
on July 20, 1955' On July 29, 1955, he was offered 
immunity and again claimed privilege urder the Fifth 
Amendment. On August id, 1955» Fitzgerald was found 
guilty of contempt in the District Court for the 
Southern District of New York for having refused to 
testify after having been granted immunity under the 
procedures set forth by the Immunity Act. He was 
given a sentence of six months and remanded to 
custody in October, 195^, to serve the sentence 
after refusing to purge himself of the contempt 
citation. 

2. The Case of William Ludwia Ullmann 

Elizabeth T. Bentley, in November, 194-5, 
identified William Ludwig Ullmann, a resident at the 
home of Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, as one of the 
individuals who was furnishing information for Soviet 
intelligence. Ullmann was born in 1908 at Springfield, 
Missouri , and entered the service of the United States 
Government in 1935' He continued service in a civilian 
capacity with the United States Government until 1942 
uihen he was inducted into the armed forces. In 194-5 
he was released from active duty with the rank of major 
and returned to civilian service with the United States 
Government until he resigned in early 194/'. 



22 



According to Elizabeth T. Bentley, Ullmann 
brought Government documents containing data vMich, 
in his opinion, would be of interest to the Soviets 
to the Silvermaster home for transmittal to Bentley. 
He provided himself with a camera and became pro- 
ficient in document photography. Bentley advised 
that Ullmann, while in the armed forces of the 
United States, furnished data on aircraft production, 
aircraft allocation and deployment and pertinent 
developments regarding the construction, planning 
and completion of a strategic-type of American 
aircraft. 

The investigation of Ullmann disclosed that 
his contacts included many of the individuals named 
by Elizabeth T. Bentley as being involved in Soviet 
espionage. 

In August, 195"^ » ^he Internal Security 
Division of the Department of Justice gave consideration 
to action against Ullmann under Public Law 600, 
Eighty-Third Congress, which is commonly referred 
to as the Immunity Act. On November J, iPS'^r 
William Ludwig Ullmann appeared before a Federal 
Grand Jury and invoked the Fifth Amendment in response 
to questions relating to the allegations of Elizabeth T. 
Bentley. On February 9> 1955t on order was granted 
directing Ullmann to answer questions propounded to 
him before the Federal Grand Jury^ After dismissal 
of an appeal by Ullmann, he again appeared before a 
Federal Grand Jury on March 8, 1955s orui refused 
to answer questions directed to him after being granted 
immunity under the Immunity Act. Contempt proceedinps 
were instituted and he was sentenced on March 8, 1955* 
to a term of six months in prison,. The conviction of 
Ullmann was upheld by the Supreme Court of the United 
States on March 26, 1956. 

J. The Case of William Walter Remington 

Elizabeth T. Bentley also identified 
William Walter Remington, an employee of the United 
States Government, as one of the sources of information 
in the Government service through which she obtained 
information for the Soviets. Remington was born 



- 23 



October 2^, 1917, in New York City and entered the 
Government service in 193^' ^^ "^^ employed 
intermittently by the Government from that date 
until 19$0. 

Remington, according to Elizabeth To 
Bentley, was introduced to her by Jacob Golos, a 
Soviet espionage agent who was one of Bentley' s 
Soviet espionage superiors in the early part of 
1942. During the following two years she met 
Remington by pre arrangements on approximately 
fifteen occasions, at which times she obtained from 
him information from the files of the War- Production 
Board. Bentley collected Communist Party dues during 
this period from both Remington and his wife. 
Remington's relationship with Bentley ceased in 1944 
when Remington joined the United States Navy. The 
activities of Remington as they involved his 
association with Bentley were verified by Remington's 
former wife. 

On January 2?, 1953, William Walter 
Remington was convicted of perjury on two counts and 
was sentenced to a term in Lewisburg Penitentiary, 
Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, after the Supreme Court 
of the United States refused to review his conviction. 
Remington died on November 24, 195^, at Lewisburg 
Penitentiary. 

b. The Testimony of Whittaher Chambers 

Earlier Soviet-directed espionage which 
successfully obtained unauthorized and vital information 
from our Government departments, as early as the 193^'^, 
was revealed by Whittaker Chambers, a confessed Soviet 
agent. 

Joining the Communist Party in 1924, Chambers 
later became active in the Party underground in New York 
City. In 1935 ^is Soviet superior, J. Peters, sent him 
to Washington, B. C, to look into the background and 
activities of another underground organization, or 
apparatus, located there, headed by Harold Ware, and 
made up of Government employees. Peters told Chambers 
to find out which members of this group could keep the 
Party well informed on current activities within their 



24 - 



respective Government departments or agencies. For 
a while Chambers acted as a morale officer and liaison 
man between this group and J. Peters in New York. In 
late 1936 this apparatus was taken over by a 
Colonel Bykov, another Soviet agent, in New York. 

Its operations were focused in Washington, 
Baltimore and New York. From 193^ to early 193° 
Chambers received from certain members of this apparatus 
important Government documents for transmittal to his 
Russian superiors. Among those who contributed were 
Alger Hiss, a State Department employee, and Franklin 
Reno who was employed at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, 
Aberdeen, Maryland. Documents would be extracted 
from Government files, photographed or typed and then 
returned without delay. Apartments were made available 
in Washington and Baltimore for photographic purposes 
and Party members schooled in photography did the work. 
Chambers was the courier and sometimes photographed the 
documents himself. The Soviets were constantly supplied 
with current information of value to our Government. 

1 . The Case of Alaer Hiss 

Chambers' chief unauthorized source of 
information was Alger Hiss, who for many years 
advanced himself within the State Department until 
he finally became Director of the Office of Special 
Political Affairs responsible for United Nations 
matters. He was one of the late President Roosevelt's 
advisors at the Yalta Conference, and was Secretary- 
General of the San Francisco Conference which organ- 
ized the United Nations Organization in 194$. 

According to Whittaker Chambers, all 
materials received by him from apparatus members, 
except Alger Hiss, were original Government docu- 
ments. At first. Hiss furnished Chambers original 
documents, but later gave him typewritten excerpts 
and summaries of State Department documents to help 
speed up operations. 



25 



Although Hiss has continually denied his 
implication in Soviet espionage , he was tried and 
convicted in IS^g-ig^O on perjury charges growing 
out of Chambers' allegations of espionage and was 
sentenced to a five-year term in a Federal 
penitentiary. 

In perjur ing himself before a Federal 
Grand Jury in 19^8 he denied that he had ever 
furnished Chambers any documents or copies of 
documents from the State Department. He also denied 
he had ever seen Chambers within the period that 
Chambers alleged he performed these espionage 
activities. 

2. The Case of Franklin Victor Reno 

In 1937 Reno was employed at the Aberdeen 
Proving Ground, Aberdeen, Maryland, and in the same 
year was introduced to Whittaker Chambers through a 
mutual Communist Party underground worker. He 
immediately fulfilled espionage assignments given 
him by turning over to Chambers on various occasions 
such vital information as the textbook qf the 
Ordnance School which dealt with ballistics, and 
mathematical data about firing tables of certain 
guns, among other things. 

Reno not only committed espionage but his 
failure to tell the truth finally fourid him serving 
a three-year term in a Federal penitentiary for 
falsifying information concerning his former Communist 
Party membership. This he concealed when filling 
out a personnel history questionnaire at Aberdeen 
in 1948. 

A Federal Grand Jury indictment in 1951 
charged him with making false statements to the Army 
on a personnel history statement and in 195^ ^s was 
sentenced as previously indicated. 



- 26 - 



B. Judith Covlon - Valentine A. Gubitchev Case 

Judith Coplon, born in Brooklyn in 1921, obtained 
employment in 194J in the Department of Justice, New York 
City. In 194^, at her request, she was transferred to 
Washington, D. C, where she was employed in the Foreign 
Agents Registration Section of the Department of Justice. 

Coplon was observed clandestinely meeting with 
Valentine A. Gubitchev, a Soviet citizen employed as an 
engineer by the United Nations Secretariat in New York City. 
After a clandestine meeting on March 4, 194-9, in New York, 
both were arrested by the FBI. In her purse at the time 
of her arrest Coplon carried summaries of confidential 
FBI reports to which she had access in her employment. 

Coplon was tried in Washington, D. C, for 
espionage and on July 1, 19^9, ^jxls sentenced to ten years 
in prison. 

Gubitchev and Coplon were tried in New York City 
for conspiring to commit espionage and were convicted. On 
March 9j ^9^0, she was sentenced to fifteen years in prison. 
On the same date, Gubitchev was also sentenced to fifteen 
years in prison; however, his sentence was suspended with the 
provision that he depart from the United States and not return. 

Although Coplon' s conviction in New York was 
reversed and she was held entitled to a new trial in 
Washington, D. C, based en technical grounds in both 
instances, it is interesting to note that Judge Learned Hand, 
Second Circuit, Court of Appeals, made a statement that even 
though the case was being reversed, the guilt of Coplon was 
plain. 

C. Fuchs - Gold ~ Rosenberg °° Atomic Espionage Conspiracu 

1. Harry Gold 

The FClaus Fuchs = Harry Gold treachery has 
become inseparable from the history of the atomic age. 
Fuchs, a German-born physicist, loas forced to flee 
Germany in 1933- He went to England where he became 
a naturalized citizen and was trusted with the most 
vital secrets of that country. In May, 1941, Fuchs 



- 27 

57425 O - 60 - 5 



was placed on research work on atomic energy and 
almost immediately he rewarded his benefactors by 
seeking out Soviet agents to whom he could and did 
give important information in his possession. In 
December, 194J, he came to the United States as a 
member of the select British mission to carry on 
further atomic research in coordination with the 
Americans. Before leaving England, Fuchs had already 
perfected arrangements to continue his espionage 
activities in the United States. These arrangements 
resulted in placing Fuchs in touch with Harry Gold, 
who in turn was in contact with Anatoli Antonovich 
Yakovlev, an official of the Soviet Consulate in 
New York City. From early 19'^ through September, 
194$, Fuchs worked with the Manhattan Engineer 
District in New York and in Los Alamos and furnished 
his information to Gold who relayed it to Yakovlev. 
Fuchs returned to England in June, 194-6, when plans 
had already been made for his future activity in 
England which lasted until 1949- 

On January 27, 1950, after the FBI had 
informed the British that Fuchs loas a Soviet spy, 
Fuchs confessed his activities on behalf of Soviet 
Russia. Concerning his American contact, all Fuchs 
was able to furnish was a meager physical description 
and the belief that this man was not a nuclear phycist 
but a person with some knowledge of chemistry and 
engineering. Within four months this contact was 
identified as Harry Gcldo 

The search for Harry Gold ended on May 22, 
1950, when he was confronted with his possession of 
a travel folder and map concerning Santa Fe, New Mexico, 
after having previously claimed that he had never been 
west of the Mississippi River. Gold, born in 
Switzerland in I9IO, had been brought to the United 
States by his Russian-born parents in 1914 and he 
became a citizen through the naturalization of his 
father. Gold admitted espionage activity on behalf 
of Russia since 1935 o.nd made available valuable 
infoTTnation concerning his activities ar.d those 
involved with him. 



- 28 



On December 9, 19^0, Harry Gold, after 
entering a plea of guilty, was sentenced to thirty 
years in prison and he is presently confined in the 
Federal penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. 

2. David Greenalass 

In May, 19-^Sr Harry Gold was given an 
assignment by Yakovlev to go to Santa Fe, New Mexico, 
to accept a delivery of vital atomic energy information 
from Fuchs. In connection with this trip, Yakovlev 
gave Gold another task; namely, to contact an American 
soldier in Albuquerque, New Mexico, to obtain from 
him information on the atomic bomb. On a Sunday 
morning in early June, 19'^^t G^old did contact the 
American soldier at the soldier's home in Albuquerque 
and delivered to him an envelope containing &500, In 
turn, the soldier delivered to Gold written information 
regarding experiments being conducted in relation to 
the atomic bomb. The two men never saw each other 
again and Gold could not recall the identity of the 
soldier. Based upon Gold's facts, an FBI investigation 
Jed to the identification of David Greenglass as the 
American soldier involved. The investigation of Greenglass 
led to the uncovering of the Soviet espionage network 
headed by Julius Rosenberg. 

The most interesting development in connection 
with the above lies in the fact that the Soviets disregarded 
one of their cardinal rules prohibiting contacts between 
members of separate espionage networks in using Gold to 
contact Greenglass. This error cost them an espionage 
network and their error was realized by them prior to 
the arrest of Greenglass as Rosenberg, the head of the 
network, when he learned of the arrest of Gold, gave 
Greenglass and his wife ^^,000 and instructions to go 
to Mexico where arrangements would be made for false 
passports with xahich they could travel to Czechoslovakia. 

Greenglass, born in New York City in 1922, 
was a machinist who served in the United States Army 
from 1943 to 19^6. He was stationed at Los Alamos 
from August, 19'^t to February, 194-6. 



-29' 



Greenglass did not leave the country as 
instructed by Rosenberg and was arrested in June, 
1950, in New York City. He confessed his espionage 
activities and was indicted on a charge of conspiracy 
to commit espionage. He entered a plea of guilty and 
after testifying as a Government witness against Julius 
and Ethel Rosenberg and Morton Sobell, he was sentenced 
to a term of imprisonment for fifteen years. 

J. Julius and Ethel Rosenberg 

The questioning of David Greenglass and his 
wife, Ruth, resulted in their admissions of espionage 
activity carried on at the instigation and under the 
direction of Julius Rosenberg, husband of David's 
sister, Ethel, for the purpose of aiding the Soviet 
Union. Julius Rosenberg, assisted by his wife, was 
able to persuade Ruth Greenglass to induce her husband 
in Los Alamos in 19^4 to make available secret data 
concerning atomic energy research which was available 
to him in his position. Subsequently, Greenglass 
furnished valuable and secret information both to 
Harry Gold and to Rosenberg concerning the developments 
at Los Alamos. 

In addition to the atomic energy information, 
Rosenberg had other espionage objectives. Max Elitcher, 
an employee of the Bureau of Ordnance, Navy Department, 
from 193° ^° 19'^d, stated Rosenberg, on approximately 
nine occasions, attempted to persuade him tc turn over 
material and drawings handled by Elitcher in his work. 
Greenglass told of Rosenberg 's boast to him that he 
once took the entire proximity fuse out of a New York 
City plant where he was stationed as a Government 
inspector. Rosenberg also told Greenglass he had 
learned of a "sky platform" on which the United States 
Government was working. He said the idea was to create 
a platform at a point in space where gravity ceased 
to exist, perhaps $,000 miles above the earth. 

Julius Rosenberg was arrested July 17, 1950, 
and his wife was arrested August 11, 195^, and both 
were charged with conspiracy to commit espionage. The 
trial of the Rosenbergs and Morton Sobell was held in 
March, 1951 1 a^ which time they were found guilty. The 
Rosenbergs were sentenced to death in April, 1951> ci^ 
were executed on June IQ, 1953' 

- 30 - 



Between the time of the sentence and the 
execution the Rosenberg case, in one form or another, 
loas before the United States District Court on sixteen 
occasions, before the United States Circuit Court of 
Appeals on nine occasions, before the United States 
Supreme Court on nine occasions and there were two 
applications for executive clemency. 

4. Morton Sobell 

The espionage activities of Morton Sobell 
rose as a result of disclosures made by Max Elitcher 
concerning the Rosenberg network. He advised that 
when he was approached by Rosenberg, a former college 
classmate, and requested to obtain information for 
transmittal to Russia, Rosenberg told him that Sobell 
was either working or cooperating with him in his 
activities. Later, Elitcher repeated this statement 
to Sobell which caused Sobell to become quite angry 
and to remark that Rosenberg should not have mentioned 
his name. Further, after Sobell moved to New York City 
in 1946 or 19^7 i ^e was instrumental in arranging 
further meetings between Rosenberg and Elitcher and, 
in doing so, indicated his knowledge of the fact that 
Rosenberg wanted to discuss with Elitcher the matter 
of his furnishing information to the RussiaTis. Also, 
in July, 19^, Elitcher accompanied Sobell in his car 
on a trip to the lower east side of New York in the 
vicinity of the Rosenberg apartment. Sobell left 
Elitcher in the car for approximately fifteen minutes 
and on his return indicated he had delivered a 'can' 
to Rosenberg, and Sobell described its contents as 
'good material.' 

An investigation was instituted and showed 
that Morton Sobell had failed to return to his place 
of employment after June 16, 1950, the day of the arrest 
of David Greenglass. It was determined Sobell and his 
family left New York City by airplane on June 23, 1950, 
and proceeded to Mexico City. While in Mexico, the 
Sobell family lived under assumed names and corresponded 
with their relatives in the United States through a mail 
drop. Sobell was arrested in Mexico City by Mexican 
security police and was turned over to the FBI at Laredo, 
Texas, He was indicted and tried with the Rosenbergs, 
On April 5$ 1951> ^e ^^^s sentenced to a term of thirty 
years. He participated in the Rosenbergs' appeals and 
since their execution appealed his case to the Supreme 
Court twice with negative results, 

- 31 - 



f. William Perl 

William Perl, bom in New York City in I918, was 
a classmate of both Julius Rosenberg and Morton Sobell at 
college. He worked for the National Advisory Committee for 
Aeronautics at Langley Field, Virginia, and Cleveland, Ohio, 
after his graduation. It was learned that Sobell maintained 
close touch with Perl through correspondence after their 
graduation from college. 

Perl admitted that in July, 19$0, a girl he 
recognized to be a former girl friend of a close friend of 
his visited him in Cleveland. He said that she explained in 
writing that a stranger instructed her to proceed from New York 
City to Cleveland to deliver a message to an aeronautical 
engineer. She wrote out the instructions for him to leave the 
United States and flee to Mexico. She mentioned the name 
"Rosenberg." This girl was located and on interview verified 
the above information and stated that Perl refused to accept 
the sum of ^2,000 which she offered to him. 

Perl was called to testify before a Federal Grand 
Jury and denied that he had been acquainted and associated 
with Julius Rosenberg and Morton Sobell, He loas found guilty 
on two counts of perjury concerning his denial of knowledge of 
Rosenberg and Sobell. On June S> ^9S3> 'i* w*® sentenced to 
serve five years on each count to run concurrently, 

6. Alfred Dean Slack 

Harry Gold voas thoroughly interviewed for information 
about his espionage associates and contacts. He told of his 
first meeting Alfred Dean Slack on the instructions of his then 
Russian superior in September, 19^0. In meetings occurring 
between 1940 and 19^2, Slack furnished information from the 
files of Eastman Kodak and concerning the making of nylon. Fate 
came to the assistance of Gold and his Soviet network when in 
September, 19^-2, Slack was transferred to the Holston Ordnance 
Works, Kingsport, Tennessee, In about April, 194A, Slack 
turned over to Harry Gold the formula for and a sample of RDX, 
a secret and powerful explosive being manufactured at the 
Holston Works. 

Slack was bom in Syracuse, New York, August 6, 
190^, of American-bom parents. When interviewed in June, 1950, 
he related his original recruitment by his brother-in-law, 
Richard Briggs, a research chemist, and his furnishing information 

- 32 - 



to the Soviets through Briggs shortly after 193^- ^^ first 
he believed the information loas used by Briggs for business 
purposes; however, later Briggs told Slack that he was passing 
the information on to the Russians, specifically one "George." 
Slack later met George and on the death of Briggs in 1939 > ^« 
continued supplying information to George, who was identified 
by Slack as Gaik Ovakimian, a Russian arrested in New York City 
in May, 1941, for violation of the Registration Act. Ovakimian 
was allowed to leave the United States in July, 1941. Slack 
admitted his contacts with Gold and the handing over to Gold of 
the formula and sample of RDX, a military explosive. 

After pleading guilty to a charge of conspiracy to 
commit espionage. Slack was sentenced in September, 1950, to 
serve fifteen years in a Federal penitentiary. 

7. Abraham Brothman 

8. Miriam Moskowitz 

Abraham Brothman first came to the attention of the 
FBI when, as a result of the disclosures of Elizabeth Bentley, 
it was learned that in 1940 she had been introduced to 
Brothman by Jacob Golos. Thereafter, she contacted Brothman 
on about ten occasions receiving from him various blueprints 
and documents for delivery to Golos. She last contacted him in 
late 1940 and gave him specific instructions on meeting his new 
Soviet contact whose identity she did not know. 

Harry Gold, after his arrest, admitted that under 
the instructions of Semen Semenov, his Soviet superior, he 
contacted Brothman in New York City in September, 1941. He 
stated thereafter he obtained blueprints, documents and other 
information of a commercial, industrial nature for transmission 
to the Soviets. 

On interview in May, 1947, Brothman furnished to the 
FBI fabricated information to the effect that he met Gold through 
Jacob Golos, then deceased. Immediately following the interview, 
he furnished Gold the substance of the statements he made and 
requested Gold to use a similar story. Brothman testified along 
the same line before a Federal Grand Jury in July, 1947, and 
when Gold later received a subpoena to testify before the same 
Grand Jury, Brothman spent two hours reviewing with Gold the 
details of his testimony to assure that their stories would 
coincide. Brothman and his business partner, Miriam Moskowitz, 
loere indicted on a charge of conspiracy to obstruct and impede 

- 33 - 



the administration of justice. Both were convicted. Brothman 
was sentenced to two years imprisonment and $10,000 fine on one 
count and five years and ^^,000 on the second count. Moshowitz 
received a sentence of two years and ^10,000 fine. On appeal 
the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Brothman' s conviction on 
the count carrying the five year sentence on the grounds that 
venue did not lie in the Southern District of New York. The 
conviction of Moshowitz was upheld. 

9. Anatoli Antonovich Yahovlev 

Yakovlev entered the United States in February, 19"^!, 
and assumed his duties as a clerk at the Soviet Consulate in 
New York City. From the first part of 1944 through late 19^5 
he directed the activities of Harry Gold and received from him 
all the atomic energy information turned over by Fuchs in the 
United States. It is interesting to note that in July, 19'^^> 
upon his return from a two-month trip to Moscow, he was made 
vice consul of the Soviet Consulate in New York City. He left 
the United States in December, 1946. He was named as a 
coconspirator and codefendant in the Rosenberg-Sobell indictment; 
however, he has not returned to the United States and has not 
been tried. 

10. Semen Markovich Semenov 

Semenov was the espionage superior of Harry Gold 
during the period from 1940 through 19-^3- ^^ first entered the 
United States in 193^ ^^'^ attended Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology where he obtained a masters degree in science in 1940. 
In July, 1941, he was designated as an official of Amtorg 
Trading Corporation, New York City. He left the United States in 
September, 1944. 



.34 - 



S, Clarence Houard Vetterli Case 

Igor Gouzenko, Code Clerk for the Soviet Military 
Attache, Ottawa, Canada, from the summer of 19^3 until his 
defection to Canadian authorities in September, 19^5> revealed 
that in August, 194$, Moscow had instructed the Soviet 
Military Attache in Ottawa to obtain a Canadian passport 
for a Soviet agent then residing in Los Angeles, California, 
under the name Ignacy Samuel Witczak. Gouzenko stated that 
Witczak's function in this country was to operate a netvoork 
of Soviet agents in the event Soviet diplomatic establishments 
were no longer available due to a break in United States - 
Soviet diplomatic relations. 

The true identity of Soviet agent Witczak has 
never been established. He used the passport and assumed 
the identity of a naturalized Canadian of the same name 
who had been born in Poland. The real Witczak had served 
with the Loyalists in Spain during the Spanish Civil War. 
He alleged that his Canadian passport had been taken from 
him upon his arrival in Spain and that it lojs subsequently 
reported to have been destroyed. 

The Soviet agent Witczak entered the United States 
in 1933 and studied at the University of Southern California. 
In 1945 ^e "OS Assistant Professor in the Political Science 
Department at that University. On November 21, 1945, he 
disappeared. 

Investigation established that Soviet agent Witczak's 
most intimate associate in the United States was Clarence Howard 
Vetterli who appeared to be cognizant of Witczak' s activities. 
Vetterli was used by Witczak for the purpose of contacting 
various individuals. On May 25, 194-9, Vetterli was brought 
before a Federal Grand Jury in Los Angeles, and denied any 
part in Witczak' s intelligence activities. Based on his 
denials he was indicted and convicted on two counts of perjury 
and sentenced to si:x years imprisonment on July 25, 195^' -^'s 
conviction was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals, 

On November 10, 1952, the United States Supreme 
Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 
remanded the case fo the United States District Court for 
resentencing of Vetterli. He was resentenced on February 2, 
1953> io a total of si-x years to be reduced by the time 
already served in custody of the Attorney General. 

-35 - 



D> Otto Verber - Kurt Ponger Case 

Otto Verber and Kurt Ponger, his brother-in-law, 
were naturalized American citizens and were members of the 
United States Armed Forces during World War II. Upon 
their discharge from the Army after World War II they 
remained in Germany and accepted civilian employment in 
connection with the Nuremburg War Crimes Trials, They 
were recruited by the Soviets to act in an espionage 
capacity against the United States Army establishment 
in Vienna, Austria, and were instructed to secure infor- 
mation concerning United States installations and 
personalities. They recruited an American employee of the 
United States Air -Force in Vienna who was operated as a 
double agent against the Soviets by the United States Army, 

The double agent returned to the IMited States 
and as a result of instructions from Ponger and Verber he 
was placed in contact with Yuri Novikov, Second Secretary 
of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D, C, Novikov met with 
the double agent on ten different occasions in Washington, 
Do C, or the immediate vicinity. The last meeting took 
place on April 22, 19^2, At some of these meetings Novikov 
accepted information from the double agent, some of which 
was of a classified nature^ Novikov showed a definite 
and particular interest in the sources of information 
utilized by the intelligence agencies of the United States 
Military establ ishment. He also indicated a desire for 
data concerning the operations of the United States Armed 
Forces in Europe and data possessed by the Air Force 
relative to vital installations such as railroad, air 
fields, heavy industry, etc, in the Soviet Union, He also 
expressed interest in information concerning the intelligence 
set-up of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
On January 14, 19S3> ^^^ United States State Department 
declared Yuri Novikov persona non grata for his activities 
in this case and Novikov departed for the Soviet Union 
on January 19, 1953' 

Verber and Ponger, the original principals in 
this operation, were brought back to the United States and 
pleaded guilty to espionage charges. On June 8, 1953* 
Verber was sentenced to a term of not less than three years, 
four months or more than ten years and Ponger was sentenced 
to a term of not less than five years or more than fifteen 
years, 

- J6 - 



F. Jack Soble Case 

In the early 19^0' s the FBI was conducting an 
intensive investigation into the activities of Vassili 
Zubilin (true name, Vassili Mikhailovich Zarubin) , Third 
Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C, Zubilin 
had entered the United States on December 25, 1941, with 
his wife, Elizabeth, and son, Peter. The investigation 
disclosed that Zubilin had been an important Soviet intelli- 
gence agent for many years. During 1934-1937 he was in the 
United States on several occasions utilizing an American 
passport fraudulently obtained under the name of Edward Joseph 
Herbert, 

The first break in the FBI investigation came when 
in the Spring of 1943r Zubilin, while under physical 
surveillance by the FBI, was observed to contact Boris Michael 
Ikirros, a motion-picture producer in Hollywood. After 
extensive investigation into the activities of Miorros, he 
was interviewed by the FBI in July, 1947, and admitted he 
was recruited by Zubilin for Soviet intelligence activities. 
Morros, thereafter, agreed to operate as a double agent 
against the Soviets under the direction of the FBI. Thus 
began an operation of intrigue which led to the expose of a 
Soviet espionage ring in New York City culminated by the 
arrest on January 25, 1957 1 ^y ^^ Agents of Jack Soble, 
Myra Soble and Jacob Albam on charges of conspiring to 
commit espionage. In addition, the FBI investigation 
resulted in identifying as Soviet intelligence agents, Jane 
and George Zlatovski , who were indicted on July a, 1957r 
charged with espionage conspiracy; Alfred and Mirtha Stern, 
who were indicted on September 9, 1957* on two counts 
charging espionage conspiracy; Ilya Wolston, who was 
charged with contempt for failing to appear before a grand 
jury and on August 7> 195^> pleaded guilty in the Southern 
District of New York; ISark Zborowski, who was indicted for 
perjury on April l8, 195^> <^s a result of his denial before 
the Federal Grand Jury that he knew Jack Soble; and Vassili 
liolev, an official attached to the Soviet Embassy, Washington, 
D. C, who was declared persona non grata, January 25, 1957' 

1 , Jack and M/ra Soble 

Jack Soble entered the United States in 1941 as 
a Lithuanian refugee and in 1947 became a United States 
citizen by naturalization. As early as 1944 Soble 

- 37 ' 



participated with other Soviet agents in the operation 
of a business concern organised to serve as a "cover" 
for Soviet agents. This was the Boris Morros i&isic 
Company with offices in New York and Los Angeles. In 
December, 1943> Vassili Zubilin introduced Morros to 
Alfred K. Stern and his wife, Mirtha Dodd Stern, at 
which time it was agreed Stern would invest $130,000 
in Morros' business, becoming an officer, and learn the 
business. This arrangement was consummated in early 
1944. Shortly after the agreement was made between the 
Sterns and Morros, Zubilin advised Morros that he was 
leaving the United States and introduced Morros to 
Jack Soble, a resident of New York City. Zubilin 
instructed that Soble was thereafter to act as Morros' 
and Stern's superior. 

Soble supervised activities of Soviet agents 
both in the United States and Hurope; assigned them to 
recruit U, S. Government employees stationed abroad, 
to obtain information concerning military equipment 
and supplies; and has claimed to have obtained infor- 
mation concerning the number of atomic bombs stockpiled 
in the United States and the rate of atomic bomb production 
as well as photographs of atomic "bunkers" in which bombs 
were stored. 

His wife, Myra Soble, also a Lithuanian refugee, 
assisted him in his espionage operations. 

Jack and Myra Soble were arrested by FBI Agents 
on January 2$, 1957* <^^ were indicted on February 4, 1957* 
on five counts charging espionage, conspiracy and violation 
of the Registration Acts. On April 10, 1957> they pleaded 
guilty to count two of the indictment which charaed 
violation of Section 793t Title id, U. S. Code (commonly 
referred to as the peace-time e:spionage Statute) which 
carriea a maximum prison sentence of ten years. On 
August 9t 1957> Myra Soble was sentenced to five and 
one-half years in Federal prison and the other counts 
of the indictment were dismissed as to her. On October 8, 
^957i Jack Soble was sentenced to seven years imprisonment. 
At that time Myra Soble' s sentence voas reduced to four 
years. The other counts of the indictment were dismissed. 



.38 - 



2. Jacob Alham 

Jacob Albam, associated with the Sobles in 
the espionage conspiracy, is also a native of Lithuania, 
His application for U. S. citizenship in 1951 ^s "o* 
been granted. Jacob Albam first came to the United 
States in 19^7 on a visitor ' s visa from France. Soble 
had an assignment from the Soviets to obtain an American 
woman for Albam to marry and to set Albam up in business 
in the United States. Albam lazs married to an American 
woman in the Spring of 19^8 and returned to France, later 
re-entering the United States as an immigrant husband 
of an American citizen and subsequently applying for 
American citizenship. He purchased an interest in a 
business in New York which later went bankrupt and 
subsequently he was employed by his brother who operates 
a business in New York City. 

Albam has been described as a specialist in 
handwriting, "copying" and photography. When contacted 
in 1955 by Boris Morros, Albam acknowledged the code 
name assigned by his Soviet supervisors, admitted receipt 
of money to establish himself in this country and agreed 
to take further Soviet instructions* 

Albam was also arrested on January 25, 1957> 
and indicted on the same charges and on the same date 
as the Sobles. He pleaded guilty to count two of the 
indictment on February 26, 1957- On August 9» 1957* 
he was sentenced to five and one-half years. The other 
counts of the indictment against Albam were dismissed. 
On October 8, 1957> Albam' s sentence was reduced to 
five years* 

3* Jane and George Zlatovski 

Jane and George Zlatovski, American citizens 
currently residing in France, served under Jack Soble' s 
supervision from 1945 to 1951- In a report intercepted 
by Boris iiorros, Jane Zlatovski claimed that while 
employed by the U. S. Army in Austria in 19^7 - 19^8, 
she obtained through her Army employment names, photographs 
and biographies of agents of the Counter Intelligence 
Corps and the Central Intelligence Agency, similar infor- 
mation concerning their "native agents" and "practically 
every scheme they hatched." Only disruption of contact 

- 39 - 



with her superiors prevented successful delivery of 
such information to the Soviet Intelligence Service. 

Jane and George Zlatovski were indicted on 
July 8, 1957' ^c indictment contained two counts 
charging both with espionage conspiracy similar to 
the Soble indictment. The Zlatovskis were not arrested 
inasmuch as they reside in France and efforts to effect 
their return from France to date have been unsuccessful. 

4. Alfred and Mxrtha Stern 

The Sterns are both American-born citizens. 
They were originally identified as Soviet agents by 
Boris Morros in July, 194^, when he reported that they 
had participated with him and Vassili Zubilin in the 
establishment of a business concern (the Boris Morros 
Music Company) which was to be used as a "cover" for 
Soviet intelligence agents. It was agreed that Stern 
would invest ^f JO, 000 in Morros' business, become an 
official and learn the business. Since Jack Soble 
pleaded guilty, he has confirmed that the Sterns were 
Soviet agents. 

When the Soble s and Albam were arrested on 
January 25, 1957* "t^e Sterns were residing in Mexico 
City. They were subsequently served with subpoenas 
calling for their appearance in New York City before 
the grand jury hearing the Soble case. They refused 
to honor the subpoenas and on Mjy 1, 1957> they were 
fined $25,000 each for contempt. On the following 
date warrants were issued for their arrest, as material 
witnesses. They were indicted on September 9> 1957* on 
two counts charging espionage conspiracy and one count 
charging general conspiracy. The Sterns were not 
arrested inasmuch as they fled from Mexico to 
Czechoslovakia clandestinely in July, 1957' 

5. II va Wolston 

Wolston was born in Russia. He entered the 
United States on April JO, 19J9' Se was naturalized 
a United Stales citizen on May l8, 194J. In 1942 - 
1946 he served in the U. S. Army, in 194J attending 
the U, S. Army Intelligence School at Camp Ritchie. 



- 40 - 



On several occasions beginning May y, 19S^r 
Jack Soble furnished Boris Morros with information 
concerning an individiml he described as a U.S. Army 
Colonel in Germany who furnished him information under 
the code name "Slava, " which was very valuable to the 
Soviets. It is noted that from October, 19^9t until 
July, 19^1 f Wolston was employed by the U.S. High 
Commissioner of Germany in Berlin. In January, 1955 1 
Soble identified his nephew, Ilya Wolston as "Slava." 
In addition. Jack Soble, pleading guilty in April, 
1957 > furnished information identifying Wolston as a 
Soviet agent who provided him information for the 
Soviets on several occasions beginning when Wolston 
was in a military camp, aboui 194J. Soble said Wolston 
gave him information concerning his assignments and 
names of four persons at the camp whom he believed could 
be approached by the Soviets. 

Information concerning the probable identifica- 
tion of Wolston as a Soviet agent was furnished to the 
Department of State in 195^f together with data developed 
concerning his black market activities in Germany. The 
Department of State, on the basis of these data, dismissed 
Wolston from his employment in Berlin. 

On August IJ, 195^> Wolston was sentenced to 
one year's imprisonment for contempt for failure to 
appear before a Federal Grand Jury in July, 1958. The 
sentence was suspended and he was placed on three years' 
probation conditioned on his being available to process 
of the court within the three-year period. 

Mark Zborowski 

Zborowski was born in Russia and became a 
naturalized U. S. citizen in New York City in June, 194'p. 
Zborowski was employed as a language consultant in 19^3- 
1944- by the War Department in New York City. Jack Soble 
advised that Zborowski acted as a Soviet agent under his 
supervision during the approximate period 194J-1945t 
furnishing information concerning Trotskyites and other 
anti-Stalin elements. Zborowski denied knowing Soble 
before a Grand Jury in February and March, 195? t ond in an 
interview August 11, 1957* However, when confronted by 
Soble on August 7, 1957 > ^^ admitted Soble had been 
one of his espionage superiors. 

Zborowski was indicted for perjury April I8, 195^) 
was found guilty after trial on November 20, 1953, and on 
December 8, 195^, loas sentenced to five years' imprisonment. 
On November 10, 1959) the Court of Appeals reversed the 
conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. 

- 41 - 



7. Vassili Molev 

Vassili Molev, while attached to the Soviet 
Delegation to the United Nations, New YorK City, in 19S3 
(handling maintenance, purchase of supplies and similar 
matters) met Boris Morros on a date and at a time and place 
previously designated by Morros' Soviet intelligence 
superiors in Austria, Molev accepted from Morros a report 
prepared in New York by Jack Soble and given by Soble to 
Morros in accordance with instructions from their Soviet 
superiors. Photographs, both still shots and motion 
pictures, of this meeting were taken by FBI personnel. 

Immediately following the arrest of Jack Soble 
on espionage charges on January 2$, 1957> ^^^ ^* ^' 
Department of State declared Molev persona non grata. 
Molev at that time was employed (in a similar capacity) 
by the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C. He left the United 
States on January 2a, 195? t «" route to Russia. 

8. Mikhail Nikolaevich Svirin 

Mikhail Svirin, a Soviet assigned to the Soviet 
United Nations Delegation, New York City, from August, 1952, 
to April, 195^i ^■oas identified by Yuri A. Rastvorov, a 
former Soviet intelligence officer, as a member of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and a very experienced 
intelligence officer. 

On two occasions in January and February, 
J-953> Svirin was observed in the area where Boris 
Morros was scheduled to meet with his Soviet superior, 
Morros subsequently met Vassili Molev on March J, 19S3* 
at the scheduled meeting place. 

Reino Hayhanen, former illegal Soviet 
intelligence agent, advised he first met Svirin in 
Moscow when Hayhanen returned from Finland in 19$2, 
Just prior to being dispatched to the United States 
as an illegal agent. After his arrival in this 
country he met Svirin on two occasions during the 
period 1952-195^ and ultimately Svirin arranged for 
him to meet Rudolf Abel, another Soviet illegal agent. 

Svirin also served as an employee of the 
United Nations Secretariat from September, 19^4, until 
October 24, 1957, when he last departed from the United 
States. 



- 42 - 



g. The Colonel Rudolf Ivanovich Abel Case 

1. Reino Hauhanen 

On May 6, 1957, Reino Hayhanen, a Soviet citizen, 
walked into the American Embassy in Paris, France, and advised 
that he uoas a Lieutenant Colonel in the Soviet State Security 
Service and had been involved in Soviet espionage in the 
United States for the past five years. He had in his 
possession an American passport issued in the name of Eugene 
Nicolai Mahi, bom May JO, 1919, Enaville, Idaho. He advised 
he had been assigned in the United States (1) to locate possible 
recruits for Soviet espionage, (2) to obtain information about 
new military installations in the United States, and (3) to 
check up on certain individuals who were of interest to Soviet 
Intelligence. He had been unsuccessful and then laas ordered to 
return to Moscow. At the time of his appearance in Paris, he 
was on his my to the Soviet Union but was afraid to return 
because of possible measures the Soviets might take against 
him for his failure. On May 10, 1957, Hayhanen was returned 
to the United States by plane at his own request. 

Hayhanen revealed he had been drafted into the 
NKVD in 1939. Following initial training and experience 
along the Finnish border, he was ordered to Moscow in 1948 
for assignment with the "illegal" or "deep cover" section 
of the Soviet State Security Service. There he was given the 
name of Eugene Maki {American-born of Estonian parents who 
had been returned as a child to Estonia) and briefed for 
assignment in the United States. To perfect his "legend" (false 
background) he went to Estonia and then to Finland under his 
assumed name and identity. Having learned the English language 
and American customs and been trained in surveillance, secret 
writing, coding and the preparation of microfilm, he arrived 
in the United States October 21, 195^' 

2. Colonel Rudolf Ivanovich Abel 

During Hayhanen's assignment in the United States, 
he had two Soviet principals. The identity of his first 
principal (I952-I953) was established as Mikhail Nikolaevich 
Svirin, First Secretary of the Soviet Delegation to the 
United Nations in 1952-1953 and later Assistant to the Assistant 
Secretary-General of the United Nations from 1954-1956. 
Hayhanen knew Svirin only as "Mikhail Ivanovich. " His other 
superior in the United States (1954-1957) "ws a colonel in the 



- 43 - 



Soviet State Security Service he knew only as "Mark." 
Investigation subsequently identified "Mark" as Ehiil R. 
Goldfus, who maintained a photographic studio in Brooklyn^ 
New York. 

Based on information furnished by the FBI, Goldfus 
was apprehended June 21, 195? t ^V ^^* Immigration and Naturaliza- 
tion Service at a hotel in New York City where he was residing 
under the name of "Martin Collins," and charged with illegal 
entry into the United States, He claimed his true name to be 
Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, Soviet citizen. On August 7, 1957* ^^ 
was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury in New York on two counts 
of espionage conspiracy and one count charging him to be an 
agent of a foreign principal without notification to the Secretary 
of State. On October 2$, 1957, Abel was found guilty on all 
counts and on November 15, 1957t foas sentenced to a period of JO 
years on the first count, 10 years and a $2,000 fine on the 
second count, and a $1,000 fine on the third count, sentences to 
run concurrently as to confinement and consecutively as to fines. 
Abel's conviction was affirmed by the United States Court of 
Appeals on July 11, 1958. Bis conviction was also affirmed by 
the United States Supreme Court on March 28, 196O. 

Methods used by Hayhanen and Abel in their contacts 
toere ingenious. In order to contact his superiors, Hayhanen 
would place chalk marks at various predesignated points. To 
minimize personal contacts and subsequent danger of compromise 
by surveillances, a system of widely separated "dead drops" 
or "banks" was established throughout the metropolitan area 
of New York. These drops were located in such places as 
Prospect Park, Riverside Drive, Fort Tryon Park, and Central Park, 
Use was made of hollowed-out coins, bolts. Jewelry, magnetic 
containers, and other objects in u^ich xoould be inserted 
film containing code or plain text messages and other material 
for transmittal. 

?. Rou Adair Rhodes 

One of Hayhanen' s assignments in the United States 
was to locate an American Army Sergeant by the name of "Quebec" 
uho had been recruited by the Soviets while assigned to the 
American Embassy in Moscow in 195^- Investigation identified 
"Quebec" as Master Sergeant Roy Adair Rhodes. The latter has 
admitted his recruitment stating he had been compromised through 
a Russian girl in Moscow with it^om he had an affair. He stated 
he was in contact with the Soviets in Moscow for approximately 
two years but had furnished no information of value to them. 

- 44 - 



Upon hia return to the United States in 19S3 'i* severed contacts 
with the Soviets. Rhodes was tried by a United States Army Court 
Martial on charges of conspiracy to commit espionage and signing 
a false loyalty oath. He was found guilty and on February 21, 
19^8, was sentenced to five years and a dishonorable discharge. 
He appealed his conviction to the Board of Review, United States 
Army, which approved the sentence imposed on Rhodes. 



.• 45 - 



II. SOVIET NATIONALS DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA 
OR OTHERWISE REMOYED FROM THEIR OFFICIAL 
ASSIGNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES FROM 
"JANUARY 2, 1950, THROUGH ZdAY 1 , i960 

The Soviet Union speaks of "peaceful coexistence* " 
Its leaders refer to Americans as "capitalist warmongers, " to 
our Government as "imperialistic, " our actions as a threat to 
world peace. Khrushchev has made much of our attempts to 
determine the existence and location of Soviet intercontinental 
missile bases, offensive weapons of war concealed behind the 
Iron Curtain of Soviet secrecy. With irresponsible exaggera- 
tions he has attempted to portray the United States as an 
aggressor nation. 

In contrast to such irresponsible statements has been 
the carefully considered action of the United States in those 
instances in which Soviet officials in this country, under 
cover of diplomatic immunity or official status, have engaged 
in aggravated acts of espionage. 

Among the numerous incidents of Soviet espionage 
during the past decade the United States has been forced to 
officially request the withdrawal of 19 Soviet officials 
because of their participation in espionage operations or other 
action completely incompatible with their continued presence in 
this country. 

Though such action has been essential to national 
dignity and the security of the United States, it has been 
frequently unpubl icized, unaccompanied by frenzied charges and 
irresponsible threats which might create issues prejudicial to 
world peace. 

A. Yuri Vasiluevich Novikov 

Novikov entered the United States April 24, 19^» as 
an attache of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C. He sub- 
sequently held the position of second secretary and from 1950 
through July, 1952, acted as editor of the official publication 
of the Soviet Embassy, the "Information Bulletin. " 



- 46 - 



On April 12, 1951, Novihov, by meeting a source in 
Washington, D, C, was identified as the new Soviet principal 
in an espionage operation which had its origin in Austria in 
19^9' Novikov, on April 12, 195l> appeared at the designated 
place on the proper date, at the designated time and gave the 
password previously agreed upon between the source and his 
Soviet espionage superiors in Austria. 

The original principals in this operation in Austria 
were two naturalized citizens, Otto Verber and Kurt L, Ponger, 
who were brought back to the United States and upon entering 
guilty pleas, xvere, on June 8, 1953> sentenced for violation 
of the espionage statute, 

Novikov operated the controlled source in the 
United States until April 22, 195^* a"d on ten occasions 
sought classified material. 

On January 14, 1953t Novikov was declared persona 
non grata by the Department of State in connection with his 
espionage activity. He departed the Uhited States on January 19, 
1953- 

B. Igor Aleksandrovich Amosov 

Amosov entered the Ohited States February I/', 1952, 
as Assistant Soviet Naval Attache, 

Amosov IMS the third Soviet principal in an intelli- 
gence operation directed by the Soviets from their naval 
attache's office. He served in this capacity from June 7> 
1952, until his departure in February, 195'^" Targets assigned 
by Amosov to the controlled source included radar developments, 
details of the latest cargo ships, manuals reflecting details 
of the latest electronic developments and bombsight data. He 
paid the source a total of j^2,000 for his services. 

While the operation functioned under Amosov' s control, 
he did not accept any material directly from the source, Amosov 
furnished instructions to the source in Washington, D, C, and 
the material was passed in the New York City area with the 
source following a set precedure of obtaining acknowledgement 
signals and, thereafter, delivering the material to a designated 
drop area, Amosov was declared persona non grata by the State 
Department on February J, 195^} as a result of his activities 
in this case and he left the United States on February 7y 195^* 

- 47 ' 



C. Aleksandr Petrovich Kovalev 

Kovalev arrived in the Vhited States October 8, 
19$0, as a second secretary of the Soviet Delegation to the 
Wiited Nations, 

For approximately two years as Assistant Soviet 
Naval Attache in Washington, D. C, he had been operating a 
controlled source, obtaining from him material of intelligence 
significance. On April 19, 195^, the Assistant Soviet Naval 
Attache told the source that in the future, material obtained 
ujas to be microfilmed and the undeveloped film laas to be 
delivered to the Soviets by means of a dead drop located in 
the New Fork area rather than through direct delivery to the 
Assistant Naval Attache. The source was told to park his car 
in a designated area in New York City at a designated time and 
to place a package wrapped in red paper therein so that it 
could be seen through the rear window in the event material 
was to be passed. An additional signal by toay of marking a 
telephone directory in a New York restaurant was perfected to 
indicate to the source that the material delivered to the dead 
drop was picked up. 

A trial run of this arrangement occurred in 
New York City on April 23, 19$2, on which date Kovalev was 
observed in the immediate vicinity of source's car, which was 
parked in the designated area and in which was placed a package 
wrapped in red paper. Thereafter, the source deposited material 
in the dead drop and on April 24, 195^» Kovalev was observed 
making the predesignated mark in the telephone directory in 
the New York restaurant. 

Material of intelligence significance was left by 
the controlled source in the New York dead drop area on 
October 1 and December 3t 1952, which material was retrieved 
by the Soviets. On June 7, ^952, the source was given by his 
Soviet principal in Washington §500 to purchase an electronic 
device for delivery to the Soviets and an additional $500 in 
payment for delivery of a microfilm reproduction of portions of 
a manual dealing with an automatic steering device for ships. 
The controlled source last heard from his Soviet principal on 
April 1, 1953, on which date he was told that a meeting 
scheduled for April 3, 1953> would not be held. 



- 48 



Kovalev loas declared persona non grata by the 
Department of State for his actions in this case on 
February J, 195^^, and he departed the United States 
February 2 0, 19S4. 

D» Leonid Igorovich Pivnev 

Pivnev entered the United States on Mirch ly, 
1950, as Assistant Soviet Air Attache. 

On November 2 and J, I9S3> while on a tour 
throughout the Southwest, Pivnev purchased aerial maps of 
Tulsa, Oklahoma, and vicinity and Dallas, Texas, and vicinity. 
Pivnev did not identify himself as a Soviet official when 
purchasing these maps. 

In the Spring of 1953> through a Washington 
businessman, he endeavored to utilize the businessman's address 
as a mail drop. He explained to the businessman that he would 
have nail delivered to him at the businessman's address, which 
mail was to be addressed to a fictitious person and which, 
upon receipt, was to be del ivered by the businessman to him. 

On March 24, 195^, he inquired at a Virginia aerial 
photographic concern as to the possibil ity of purchasing 
aerial maps of Chicago, Illinois. He instructed the firm to 
seek such maps and agreed to pay approximately ^8,000 for them. 
On that date he purchased JJ aerial photographs of Washington, 
D. C, and vicinity. Pivnev, in contacting this firm, identi- 
fied himself as one "George." He did not indicate his official 
connection with the Soviet Embassy. 

On May 3, 1954, he contacted a Washington, D, C, 
photographer, introducing himself as a Mr. George Tinney, a 
representative of a private firm desirous of purchasing aerial 
photographs of New York City at a scale of 1:20,000 tol:40,000 
feet. Photographs of this type were not commercially available. 
On May IJ, 19^4, he agreed to pay the photographer $700 to 
obtain the photographs. He advanced on that date the sum of 
0400 as partial payment. 

On 2iiy 20, 1954, when meeting with the photographer 
for the purpose of obtaining the photographs, he was accosted 
by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on 
which occasion he identified himself. On my 29, 1954, the 
Department of State declared Pivnev persona non grata for his 
action, and he departed June 6, 1954' 

- 49 ' 



E, M2ksim GriQorievich Martunov 

Mxrtynov last entered the United States on 
November 3i 195^) as a member of the Soviet Representation 
to the Uhited Nations Military Staff Committee, 

In August, 195^> '^ highly placed Army officer in 
Germany was introduced to a Soviet under clandestine circum- 
stances in the Soviet sector of Berlin, The Soviet, aware 
of the officer's plan to retire from the Army, asked him to 
be of assistance when the Soviet came to the United States, 
The officer did not discourage the Soviet's approach and 
meetings in New York City were arranged, A code phrase was 
established for recognition purposes. 

On November 1$, 195^, a Special Agent of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, made up to resemble the Army officer, 
was contacted at the agreed time and place in New York City by 
Martynov. Prearranged signals were exchanged and they talked 
for approximately thirty minutes, Martynov indicated he was a 
friend of the Soviet who contacted the officer in Germany and 
he asked for the officer's assistance, paying him $2$0, A 
subsequent meeting was scheduled for January 1$, 1955' 

On that date, Martynov kept the appointment and 
with State Department permission, FBI Agents accosted him, 
Martynov identified himself and claimed diplomatic immunity. 
On February 21, 1955> 'the Department of State declared 
Martynov persona non grata for the above activity and he 
departed the United States February 26, 1955' 

F, Aleksandr Konstantinovich Guri/anov 

Guryanov entered the Uhited States March 26, 1955 > 
as an employee of the Soviet Delegation to the Uhited Nations, 

On April 25, 195^> Guryanov was declared persona non 
grata by the [Mi ted States Department of State as a result of 
his implication in the improper repatriation ia the USSR of 
five Soviet seamen uMo left the Uhited States on April 7> J-95^' 
The seamen were members of the crew of the Soviet tanker 
"Tuapse" who previously defected to the Uhited States, The 
Department of State informed the Soviet Government that 
Guryanov's activities made his presence in the Uhited States 
no longer desirable and he departed May 9> 195^* 

- 50 - 



G- Ivan Aleksandrovich Bubchikov 

Bubchikov entered the United States December 1, 
195^t <3s cin Assistant Soviet Military Attache. 

From July, 1955t through Ji£iy, 195^> Bubchikov 
Tnaintained contact with a naturalized American citizen of 
Russian origin who was employed as a sales engineer. In 
July, 1955f ^* appeared at the sales engineer' s residence 
late in the evening and sought his cooperation in securing 
data concerning Jet fuel, atomic submarines, and aeronautical 
developments. Bubchikov promised the engineer large sums of 
money; however, even though seemingly important information 
was furnished to him, he did not fulfill his promise of 
large payments. During the course of this operation it was 
featured by clandestine meetings, complex recognition signals, 
and a variety of "drop areas" in which the source deposited 
material for the Soviet. 

In view of his activities in connection v>ith the 
engineer, the Department of State, on June 14, 195^> declared 
Bubchikov persona non grata for engaging "in espionage 
activities incompatible with his continued presence in this 
country." He departed the United States June 24, 195^' 

H. Boris Fedorovich Gladkov 

Gladkov entered the United States December 1$, 
^953> ^^ naval advisor to the Soviet Representation in the 
Military Staff Committee of the United Nations (UN). 

In January, 1955> Gladkov, at a cocktail party, 
met a sales engineer for a New York City marine engineering 
firm. He cultivated the sales engineer and held a number of 
clandestine meetings with him. Through the engineer, on 
June 14, 1955} ^^ received two unclassified publications 
dealing with marine boilers. During his meetings with the 
sales engineer which continued on a regular basis through 
June, 1956, Gladkov furnished the engineer ^1,550 for 
services rendered. 

On June 22, 195^, the Department of State declared 
Gladkov persona non grata for engaging in "activities which 
were highly improper and incompatible" with his status as a 
member of the Soviet Delegation to the UN. He departed 
July 12, 1956. 

- 51 - 



I. Rostislav E. Shapovalov 

Shapovalov entered the United States September 2'P, 
1955 f as a second secretary of the Soviet Delegation to the 
IMi ted Motions (UN). 

On Miy 7, 14, ly and 21, 195^> Shapovalov con- 
tacted a Russian emigre in New York City and urged him to 
return to Russia. The emigre, Michael Schatoff, a former 
officer in the Russian Army, was a classmate of Shapovalov 
at a New York university. 

On August 20, 195^> i^^ Department of State declared 
Shapovalov persona non grata for his activities in attempting 
to induce Schatoff to return to the Soviet Union. 

Shapovalov departed the United States September 12, 
1956. 

J. Viktor Ivanovich Petrov 

Viktor Ivanovich Petrov arrived in the 
United States February ly, 1953) ^s a translator employed 
at the United Nations (UN) Secretariat, New York City. 

In December, 1955> ^^ responded to an advertisement 
placed in a New York newspaper by an aviation draftsman for 
part-time work. The draftsman was an employee of one of our 
largest aircraft factories. At the outset, Petrov gave the 
draftsman insignificant drafting work, later asking him to 
send for various brochures on. aviation. On April 5) 195^' 
Petrov requested the draftsman to obtain information concern- 
ing United States military aircraft. The information sought 
loas classified and, according to the United States Air Force, 
would have been a good guide concerning the status of 
United States aircraft development. 

On August 20, 195^, a representative of the 
Department of Justice and the United States Representative 
to the UN conferred with the Secretary General of the UN, 
who agreed to dismiss Petrov. On August 21, 195^, charges 
against Petrov were presented to the Deputy Soviet UN Repre- 
sentative and on August 2J, 195^, the UN received a two-line 
resignation from Petrov which requested acceptance by 
August 2y, 1956' The Secretary General of the UN agreed not 
to accept the resignation and to proceed with Petrov' s 
dismissal . Petrov hurriedly departed the United States on 
August 23, 1956. 

- 52 - 



K. Konstantin Pavlovich Ekimov 

Ehimov entered the Vhited States October 17, 
1955t OS second secretary of the Soviet Delegation to the 
United Nations (W). 

Newspapermen and Immigration and Naturalization 
representatives in testimony before the Senate Internal 
Security Subcommittee, accused Ekimov of participating in 
the abduction of Tanya Chwastov, aged two, an American- 
born daughter of a Bussian refugee. It was alleged that 
Ekimov participated on October J, 195^, in dockside arrange- 
ments enabling Alexei Chwastov to leave the United States 
with his infant daughter. This move was against the wishes 
of the child's mother who remained in the United States. 
Ekimov was declared persona non grata by the Department of 
State on October 29, 195^, and he departed the United States 
on November JO, 195^. 

L. Yuri Pavlovich Krulov 

Krylov entered the United States May 4, 1955> "^s 
Assistant Soviet Military Attache, Washington, D. C. 

In April, 195^1 Krylov was introduced to the 
manager of a Washington electronics supply house. Through 
the Washingtonian, who cooperated with the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, Krylov purchased hard-to-grt electronic 
equipment. 

In August of 1955t Krylov contacted an employee 
of the Atomic Energy Commission and attempted to obtain from 
him information concerning the technical aspects of nuclear 
power. In December, 1955i ^* contacted a former commissioner 
of the Atomic Energy Commission in an effort to develop 
information concerning atomic energy for space heating. In 
February, 195^> ^^ attempted to purchase 26 unclassified films 
on peace-time atomic energy. 

In February, 195^> ^* endeavored to Join the 
Society of American Military Engineers and to subscribe to 
the publication "The Military Engineer," ichich contained 
information concerning United States fortifications. 

On January 14, 195? > the Department of State 
declared Krylov persona non grata as a result of his 
activities. He departed the United States January 26, 1957' 

- 53 - 



} 



M> Vassili Mikhailovich JiibJev 



From August, 1944, through January, 1957* M>2ev 
served several tours of duty in the Uhited States, occupying 
position! of chauffeur and property custodian to the Soviet 
Consulate General in New York and property custodian at the 
Soviet Embassy, Washington, D, C, 

Boris liorros, an admitted Soviet agent cooperating 
with^e FBI, was instructed by his Soviet superiors to appear 
in the vicinity of $8 West $8th Street, New York City, at 
3 p»m, on the first Tuesday of each month for contact by his 
Soviet principal. If the contact was not made, Morros was 
instructed by the Soviets to return the following Wednesday 
and Thur^ay. On Wednesday, January y, 1953> Special Agents 
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation observed Molev in the 
vicinity of ^8 West 58th Street, New York City. 

Morros was later instructed by his Soviet principal 
to meet his Soviet contact on Tuesday, Mzrch J, 1953t on the 
corner of Central Park South and Avenue of the Americas, 
New York City. On Mxrch J, 19S3* liolev was observed by 
Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation con- 
summating a meeting with Morros at Central Park South and 
Avenue of the Americas. On this occasion Morros passed to 
Molev a report previously obtained from Jack Soble, Morros' 
immediate superior, uho was subsequently convicted of espionage. 
Molev, on Mxrch J, 1953t issued instructions to Morros for a 
subsequent meeting; however, that meeting was not effected* 

On January 2$, 1957 > Jack Soble, Myra Soble, and 
Jacob Albam were arrested on charges of espionage and conspiracy* 
Simultaneously, Molev was declared persona non grata because of 
his implication in the conspiracy. He departed the United States 
January 28, 1957. 

N. Vladimir Arsenevich Grusha 

Vladimir Arsenevich Grusha was formerly assigned as 
first secretary of the Soviet Delegation to the Uhited Nations 
(UN). 

On the night of March 5$ 1957 y Dhanapalo Samarasekara, 
a Ceylonese national employed at the UN Secretariat, New York 
City, was observed by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) to enter the Ceylonese Delegation to the UN. 

- 54 - 






At 7 P'fi. on that date Samaras ehara was observed on the fourth 
floor of that building opening what appeared to be a file 
cabinet and examining some papers. He was observed to have 
left the delegation shortly thereafter carrying an airline- 
type handbag. He drove to an area where Vladimir Grusha was 
observed standing on a corner. Approximately one ?wur later 
Samarasekara was observed to return to the same area where 
Grusha was seen getting into Samaras ekara's automobile. After 
driving a short distance, Grusha left the car and Samarasekara 
returned to the Ceylonese Delegation. He was at that time 
observed on the fourth floor of the building where he was 
observed opening the same file cabinet he opened earlier in 
the evening. He was then observed carefully placing a red 
book in the cabinet. He left the delegation shortly thereafter. 

It loas subsequently learned that the Ceylonese code 
book was red in color and that the code room of the Ceylonese 
Delegation was located on the fourth floor of the Ceylonese 
Delegation building. 

Subsequently interviewed, Samarasekara admitted 
going to the Ceylonese Delegation building and later meeting 
with Grusha on the night of ISxrch 5t ^957' He denied passing 
any information to the Soviet, 

Based on information developed by the FBI, the 
Department of State declared Grusha persona non grata on 
I£Lrch 2$, 1957t <3;nd he departed from the United States on 
April 10, 1957' The Department of State instructed the 
United States Mission tothe UN to request the Secretary General 
of the UN to dismiss Samarasekara from the UN Secretariat, 
Samarasekara was advised on July 5> 1957i that he was suspended 
with pay, A committee was appointed by the Secretary General 
to investigate the allegations against him and on December l6, 
1957> the Secretary General informed the United States Mission 
to the UN that he had terminated Samaras ekara ' s employment. 

0. Gennadi Fedorovich Mashkantsev 

Mxshkantsev served as an employee of the Consulate 
Division of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. Co, handling 
repatriation matters. He arrived in the Ifiiited States 
October 2$, 1956. 

On March 12, 1957* ^^ appeared at the home of Petr 
Pirogov, Russian flyer who, with Anatoli Barsov, defected to 
the mi ted States in Austria in 1948. Barsov redefected to 

- 55 - 



Bussia in 19^9 and, according to Vladimir Petrov, the 
former Soviet intelligence officer who defected in Australia, 
after lengtly interrogation uxis executed* 

Upon visiting Pirogov, Mishkantsev delivered to 
him a lengthy handiaritten letter purportedly from Barsov. 
The letter petitioned Pirogov to return to the OSSB. Examina- 
tion of the letter established that it was not in the hand- 
writing of Barsov but was a carefully prepared simulation* 
As a result, on April 17, 1957) Mishkantsev was declared 
persona non grata for "improper activities directed toward 
inducing return to the Soviet [fiiion of persons who have 
sought asylum in the United States. " Mishkantsev departed 
April 25, 1957- 

P. Nikolai Ivanovich Kurochkin 

Kurochkin entered the United States, April 4, 195^t 
as a third secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D, C, 

In the Fall of 1956, Charles T. Beaumet, a pro- 
fessional writer, contacted the Soviet Embassy seeking 
statistics as to hosiery production in the Soviet Union. He 
met Kurochkin, who supplied the desired statistical data and, 
after a series of meetings, informed Beaumet that if he would 
obtain military information to be incorporated in articles 
Kurochkin was writing for Buss ian military journals, he would 
share with him his proceeds from the articles. Thereafter, 
Beaumet, utilizing the entree he enjoyed as a reporter, 
obtained training and field manuals of the U« So Army vahiph 
he turned over to Kurochkin. For the various manuals delivered 
to Kurochkin, Beaumet was paid approximately $450„ Included 
among the manuals sought by Kurochkin were two which were 
classified. The classified manuals were not delivered to 
the Soviet. 

0?i June 6, 195^> Kurochkin was declared persona 
non grata for engaging in highly improper activities 
incompatible with his diplomatic status. He departed from 
the United States on June 11, 195^' 

Q. Kirill Sergeevich Doronkin 

Doronkin arrived in the United States March 12, 
1956* to serve as Film Editor, Badio and Visual Division 
of the Department of Public Information, l^i ted Nations (UN) 

-56 - 



Secretariat. He returned to the USSR on home leave 
April 17, 19S^> <2"^ re-entered the United States July 29, 
1956' 

In October, 195^> ^ source recruited by the 
Soviets obtained aerial photographs of the Chicago area for 
delivery to an unknown individual whom he loas instructed to 
meet at a prearranged spot in the parking area adjacent to 
the railroad station in Soarsdale, New York* On November 1$, 
1956} the source arrived at the designated area to keep his 
scheduled meeting with the unknoum Soviet. Special Agents of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation observed Doronkin and his 
wife arrive at the parking lot at 6 p.m., November 1$, 195^* 
At 6:^$ p.m. Doronkin and his wife left their car and uhile 
Doronkin's wife strolled about the immediate area, Doronkin 
was seen to talk to the source. The source was observed to 
pass to Doronkin a paper-wrapped package which he took from 
the trunk of his automobile. Shortly thereafter the source, 
Doronkin and his wife re-entered their respective cars and 
left the area. The source reported that he turned over to 
Doronkin the requested atrial photographs of the Chicago area. 

The United States Mission to the UN delivered a 
note to the Secretary General of the UN on January 1$, 1959> 
requesting Doronkin's dismissal from the UN because of this 
activity. Doronkin's contracted term of entployment terminated 
jUUrch J, 1959t and he was not re-employed by the UN. He 
departed from the United States Itfarch 11, 1959' 

R. Evgeni Alekseevioh Zaostrovtsev 

Zaostrovtsev entered the United States August 2, 
1957> °s "3 second secretary of the Soviet Embassy, JfHshington, 
D. C. 

On February 2J, 1958> Zaostrovtsev met a State 
Department foreign service officer in training, at a social 
function. There followed intensive efforts on the part of 
Zaostrovtsev to cultivate the State Department employee for 
intelligence purposes. Between February, 195^* a"<^ February:^, 
1959f he met with the State Department employee on 1$ 
occasions. He obtained from the State Department employee 
material concerning the training program of foreign service 
officers and endeavored, without success, to obtain classified 
documents from State Department files concerning the political 
and economic affairs in the area of the GovernniBnt employee's 
future foreign assignment. He paid the Government employee 
fl50 for information furnished to him. 

- 57 - 



A3 a result of his dealings with the State 
Department employee, the Department of State on Mzy IJt 
19$9t made an informal request of the Soviet Embassy for 
Zaostrovtsev's recall. Zaostrovtsev departed the 
United States on Miy 1$, 1959- 

S. Vadim Aleksandrovich Kirilxjuk 

Kirilyuk arrived in the United States September 11, 
195S> as a political affairs officer enq)loyed by the 
Department of Trusteeship and Information from Non-Self 
Governing Territories, United Nations (UN) Secretariat* In 
April, 1959> <3n American citizen contacted a Soviet official 
in Mexico City concetning the possibility of obtaining a 
Soviet university scholarship. The Soviet obtained complete 
background information from the American, including the facts 
concerning his previous assignment in cryptographic machines 
and systems while serving in the Uhited States Army* following 
his return to the United States, the American was contacted 
by Kirilyuk, who identified himself as one "George." 

During the period from June through September, 1959 1 
Kirilyuk met with the American in a clandestine manner on five 
occasions. On these occasions he requested data concerning 
cryptographic machines and instructed the American to seek 
employment with a vital Uhited States Government agency, 
Kirilyuk's meetings with the source on August 28, 1959* ond 
on September l8, 1959> were observed by Special Agents of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

The Secretary General of the UN was informed of 
Kirilyuk's espionage activity on December I/', 1959* On 
January 7) 19^0, the Soviet Delegation to the UN was advised 
of Kirilyuk's activities, whereupon Kirilyuk and his family 
left the Ifiiited States on January 10, I96O. 



58 - 



Ill, INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF 307IET SSPIONAOS 
AGAINST THE UNITED STATES 

Espionage , by its very nature, ia international - 
the attempt by one oountry to obtain the aeorets of another. 
Frequently a third country, beoauae of its neutrality or 
atrategic acceaaibility, ia uaed aa a baae for auch operationa, 
its citigena, often having privilegea aa alliea of the target 
country, recruited aa agenta. The Soviet Union, now critical 
of American uae of overaeaa baaea, haa for many yeara directed 
espionage operationa againat the United Statea through other 
countries. Petr Derjabin, Soviet intelligence officer who 
defected in Auatria in 1954, atated that in December, 1951, 
when Lieutenant General Sergei R. Savchenlso became Chief of 
the GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence Service), he iaaued 
ordera that it would be neceaaary to intensify operationa 
against the United States from beyond our borders. His 
instructions have been carried out, 

A, Dr, Alan Nunn Uav 

Dr. Alan Nunn Hay waa born in Birmingham, England, 
in 1911, In 1943 he was sent to Canada with a group of 
prominent British nuclear phyaioiata to worlf on the atomic 
bomb project for the Canadian Department of Scientific and 
Industrial Research. 

Igor Gouaenko, Soviet code clerk who defected in 
Canada September 5, 1945, described May as one of the most 
important Soviet agents under Colonel Nikolai Zabotin, Soviet 
Military Attache and chief of Soviet Military Intelligence 
operationa in Canada, Dr, May furnished Zabotin's organi- 
sation with voluminous, vitally important information concern- 
ing atomic fusion, including specimens of uranium 833 and 
uranium 835, Gousenko stated that May had been in the pay 
of the Soviet Union for many years and had been a secret 
member of the Communist Party of Great Britain, 

Immediately after the bombing of Hiroshima in 
August, 1945, Zabotin wired to Moscow certain iryformation 
received from May, forwarded a report by May setting forth 
production figurea and furnished a amall quantity of 
uranium 833, May had access to uranium 833 in connection 
with his work in Canada but did not have access to 
uranium 835 which may have been obtained when he visited 

- 59 - 



the Metallurgical Laboratory of the University of Chicago in 
September and October, 1944-, Miy also furnished to the 
Russians information concerning the proximity fuse. 

Mxy returned to the United Kingdom in September, 
19^5t ond in February, 19^6, was arrested by British authori- 
ties in London and charged with violation of the Official 
Secrets Act, Subsequently, on a plea of guilty, Miy was 
sentenced to serve 10 years in a British penitentiary, 

B. Sam Carr 

From information furnished by Igor Gouzenko, together 
with documents which he abstracted from the Soviet Embassy in 
Canada, it was established that Sam Carr was one of the most 
important espionage agents operated by the Soviet Military 
Intell igence Service in Canada during 19^2-194-$. Sam Carr, 
born as Schmil Kogan July ^, 1906, at Kharkov, Russia, was 
naturalized as a Canadian citizen in 1931* An old communist 
of international reputation, he had long been active in 
illegal and intelligence work. 

In Mxrch, 1946, following the defection of Igor 
Gouzenko, Carr suddenly disappeared from Canada, fleeing 
behind the Iron Curtain. Having altered his appearance 
and assumed a new name and identity, Carr surreptitiously 
entered the Uhited States in the Fall of 19^8 and in January, 
1949> was apprehended by the FBI in New York City. Carr was 
returned to Canada and on April 8, 1949* "ws convicted in 
Ottawa of conspiracy to violate Canadian law in the procure- 
ment of a fraudulent passport. He was sentenced to six years 
in prison. 

C. Ignacu Samuel Witczak 

One of the individuals for whom Sam Carr was 
instructed to obtain false documentation was a Soviet agent 
using the assumed name of Ignacy Sarmiel Witczak. According 
to Igor Gouzenko, Moscow had instructed the Soviet Military 
Attache of Ottawa in August, 194-5} to obtain a Canadian 
passport for a Soviet agent then in Los Angeles, California, 
under the name of Witczak. Gouzenko stated that the latter's 
function in the United States was to operate a network of 
Soviet agents in the event of a break in United States- 
Soviet diplomatic relations. However, the FBI established 
that Witczak was engaged in recruiting individuals in the 

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United States for intelligence assignments in the Orient 
and South America. The persons recruited were given funds, 
passage, and i?istr-uctions for establishing contact with other 
Soviet agents upon reaching their destination. 

The Soviet agent posing as Witczak had assumed the 
name and identity of a real Ignacy Samuel Witczak, a Polish- 
bom naturalized citizen of Canada who had served with the 
Loyalists in Spain and had surrendered his Canadian passport 
upon arrival in that coimtry in 1937' Using this passport, the 
false Witczak, a Soviet illegal agent, had arrived in the 
United States the following year. 

In New York City in 194$, Witczak, the impostor, was 
in contact with Leonid S. Ualov, clerk of the Soviet Consulate, 
who was clearly implicated in Soviet espionage operations and 
in November, 194$, was also in contact with Lieutenant Nikolai G. 
Red in who loas brought to trial the following year on charges 
of espionage. In California the false Witczak was in contact 
with Mikhail F. iAikhachev, Assistant to the Soviet Vice-Ccnsul 
in Los Angeles and a reported Soviet intelligence agent. 

The Soviet agent posing as Ignacy Samuel Witczak 
disappeared November 21, 194$. uis most intimate associate in 
the United States was Clarence H. Vetterli, whom Witczak had 
used in making contact with potential recruits. On the basis 
of denials, before a Federal Grand Jury in Los Angeles, of 
participation in Witczak's intelligence operations, Vetterli 
was convicted July 12, 19$1, on charges of perjury and on 
July 2$, 19$1, was sentenced to a total of sijc years imprison- 

\ ment, 

I 

D. Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs 

Forced to flee his native land in 1933* ^H Julius 
, Klaus Fuchs, German-bom nuclear physicist^ sought refuge in 
i Great Britain. In 1941, having received the greater portion 
I of his higher education in Great Britain, Fuchs was entrusted 
: with research work on atomic energy. Almost immediately 

he sought out Soviet agents to whom he could and did give 

secret information to which he had access. 

\ In December, 1943, Fuctis arrived in the United States 

I as a member of a group of British scientists selected to carry 
on further atomic research in coordination with that of this 
country. Before leaving Britain, Fucfis had perfected arrange- 
ments to continue his espionage operations. As a result of 

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such arrangements, relayed through Moscow, Fuchs was placed 
in contact with Barry Gold who was in contact with Anatoli A, 
Yakovlev, clerk of the Soviet Consulate in New Fork City, 
From early 1944 through September, 19^5, Fuchs worked with 
Manhattan Engineer District in New York and at the Los Alamos 
Laboratory in New Mexico, during which time he repeatedly 
transmitted secret atomic energy information to Yakovlev 
through Harry Gold, Upon returning to England in June, 19^> 
Fuchs continued to supply his Soviet superiors with secret 
infOTTnation concerning atomic research until 19^9* Interrogated 
by British authorities, on January 27, 1950, Fuchs confessed 
to his operations on behalf of the Soviet Ifiiion, 

On March 1, 1950, Fuchs entered a plea of guilty 
in England to charges of violating the Official Secrets Act 
and was sentenced to 14 years in prison, 

E, Pontecorvo, Burgess and Maclean 

In September, 1950, several months after the arrest 
of atomic spy Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs, an outstanding British 
scientist. Dr. Bruno Fontecorvo, disappeared behind the Iron 
Curtain, Thirty-seven years of age at the time, Pontecorvo 
was a naturalized British subject of Italian birth. He had 
worked with Enrico Fermi in Home, Italy, until 193^ when he 
went to Paris, France, to escape religious persecution under 
the fascist regime. In Paris, he worked with Frederic Joliot- 
Curie, leading French nuclear physicist and admitted communist, 
Pontecorvo fled from France following the invasion by Nazi 
forces in 1940, One of the scientists responsible for the 
development of the Neutron Theory, subsequently applied in 
the creation of the atomic bomb, he arrived in the Ohited States 
in August, 1940, Here he was employed by a private concern in 
the location of oil deposits but later engaged in atomic energy 
experiments and cosmic ray research for the British Government 
in Canada and at the time of his disappearance was employed at 
the British atomic establishment located at Harwell, England, 
In 1955 ii '^oas reported that Pontecorvo, then in Moscow, US£R, 
where he was working on Soviet atomic projects, claimed that 
he had left the "capitalist world" because of preparations 
being made for the use of atomic energy for military purposes. 

On May 25» 195-^> ^w British diplomats, Guy Francis 
DeMoncy Burgess and Donald Duart Maclean, also disappeared, 
Maclean had been assigned as a member at the British Embassy, 
Washington, D, C, from May, 1944, until September, 1948, 



62 - 



Burgess served in a similar capacity in the Ifi^ited States 
from August, 1950, until his recall in May, 1951' I'n 
February, 195^ t they handed a prepared statement to members 
of the press in Moscow, OSSR, in which both admitted having 
been communists at college and stated that Burgess arranged 
for their escape inasmuch as Maclean was under surveillance, 
Vladimir M, Petrov, Soviet intelligence officer who defected 
in Australia in 195^t stated that he had learned from a 
colleague that the flight of Burgess and Maclean, both 
long-term Soviet agents, had been planned from Moscow, 



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■cA\ 



X 



Free Library of Philadelphia 

351.74 Un3e 

United States. 

Exposbe of Soviet espionage, M 



3 2222 03113 5645 



^1~ 32269 



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